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ABSTRACT  
   
This thesis is an art-historical inquiry into the National Endowment for the Arts 
(NEA) and its controversies in the 1990s. A socio-economic model of instrumentalization 
of the arts based on Pierre Bourdieu's and David Throsby's conceptualizations of cultural 
capital is first developed. The model is then used to explore the notion of "congressional 
aesthetics," or a particular brand of arts-instrumentalization adopted by the U.S. Congress 
for post-WWII federal projects involving art, and two cases of its implementation. The 
first case is the successful implementation of congressional aesthetics in the 
instrumentalization of the arts in Sino-American cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. 
The kind of American art in the 1950s enabled the successful implementation of 
congressional aesthetics. The opposite case is then investigated: the failed 
implementation of congressional aesthetics in the operation of the NEA in the 1980s. 
Specifically, the NEA controversies of the 1990s can be traced to the agency's failure to 
conform to congressional aesthetics. Failed congressional aesthetics also results largely 
from the type of American art being produced in the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
When President Johnson signed into law National Foundation for the Arts and 
Humanities (Public Law 89-209) in September 1965, he created the National Endowment 
for the Arts (NEA) to administer direct government support for the arts in the United 
States.  The federal agency led a quiet, comfortable existence of modestly increasing 
appropriations from Congress for the first 25 years of its existence.  Then, suddenly, the 
NEA became an epicenter of the culture wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the 
agency was associated with the support of art of Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano, 
then later in the 1990s the “NEA Four” of John Fleck, Holly Hughes, Tim Miller, and 
Karen Finley. “By July 1989,” Zeigler writes, “the contenders in the crisis had been 
identified: the National Endowment for the Arts; the arts community of institutions and 
individual artists; Congress; the media; and the religious right.  The last of these groups 
was among the most vicious: for the right, the NEA was a target that could replace 
communism (removed by the end of the Cold War)” (1994, p. 76).  During the culture 
wars the NEA’s critics charged the federal agency with assaulting “public decency” and 
generating “moral indignation.”  Although in actuality the NEA did not provide direct 
funding to these artists, it was depicted as solely responsible for their public support and 
thrust into the middle of the related debates.  Exploiting the NEA’s vulnerability from 
these controversies, the Republican takeover in the congressional elections of November 
1994 was poised to launch a fatal political attack on the agency.  A section of a pivotal 
1995 House budget resolution entitled “Terminate Funding for the National Endowment 
for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities” asserted that “there is 
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serious philosophical debate about whether financing artistic creation is an appropriate 
government activity in the first place.”  Moreover, First Amendment issues on 
government support for the arts multiplied: “On every front,” Storr wrote in 1991, “legal 
challenges are being made to the freedom of serious artists, clever opportunists, dedicated 
amateurs, and ordinary people to represent the world as they see it” (Storr, 1991, p. 12).  
It seemed that the government was trying to extricate itself strenuously from supporting 
the arts and indeed, possibly censoring or otherwise suppressing and limiting the arts in 
the U.S. 
Almost two and one-half millennia before the NEA and the American culture 
wars, Plato, the classical Greek philosopher of the late 5th, early 4th century B.C., was 
immersed in a classical culture war of sorts when he composed the Republic.  The 
Republic is “Plato’s reflection on the conduct, execution, and impact of a particular war, 
the pan-Hellenic Peloponnesian War, in whose aftermath he wrote the dialogue and 
against whose backdrop it is set” (Frank, 2007, p. 445).  The untruthful arts, Plato 
believes, are both symptomatic of and a likely cause of the unhealthy, weak city-state that 
Athens had become after losing the Peloponnesian War to Sparta.  In Book 10, Plato 
explores the intersection of politics and the arts by having Socrates compose a letter to 
the Homer, the epic poet of the 8th century B.C. who metonymically stands for “art” in 
the Republic.   Plato through Socrates posits the following question: “If Homeric poetry 
could improve the state by revealing or reflecting civic practices conducive to the 
happiness and virtue of the citizenry, then what state has benefited from Homer’s art?” 
(p. 10.599d).   
  3 
Plato’s answer is that no state’s citizens have benefitted from Homer.  Insofar as 
the arts impart no truth and considerable falsehood, Plato’s arts policy is concerned with 
the art’s public effects on the virtue of a state’s citizenry.  “What Plato is saying of these 
poets…is that they have bad effects.  They promote ignorance, stultify philosophic 
inquiry by surrounding falsehood with an aura of piety, and reinforce poor morality by 
exhibiting the gods as exemplars of the worst sort of misconduct” (Elias, 1984, p. 213).  
To protect the citizenry’s virtue as well as to ameliorate a fatal Athenian infirmity 
contributing to its decline), Plato banishes Homeric poetry from his ideal state.  Much 
like conservative lawmakers did to the NEA during the American culture wars, Plato 
censors Homeric poetry – and indeed all of art – in the Republic as rulers must make laws 
for an ordered and balanced state.  Instrumentalizing art, Plato thus severs the link 
between art and politics in his ideal state because art is not useful to the state.  The 
parallels between Homer and the NEA, Plato and Congress are suggestive of the 
instrumentalization of the arts: art and politics can peacefully co-exist if the arts are 
useful to the state.     
For my thesis, I propose an art-historical inquiry into the NEA controversies in 
the 1990s based on a cultural-capital conceptualization of the instrumentalization of the 
arts.  In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, the thesis will be divided into three 
chapters.  The first chapter will develop a socio-economic model of instrumentalization 
of the arts based on Pierre Bourdieu’s and David Throsby’s conceptualizations of cultural 
capital.  The second and third chapters utilize the model to explore what I call 
“congressional aesthetics,” or a particular brand of arts-instrumentalization adopted by 
the U.S. Congress for post-WWII federal projects involving art.  Chapter 2 describes the 
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successful implementation of congressional aesthetics in the instrumentalization of the 
arts in Cold War cultural diplomacy between China and the US.   I argue in Chapter 2 
that the kind of American art in the 1950s enabled the successful implementation of 
congressional aesthetics in Cold War cultural diplomacy.  Further, the Chinese 
government was also able to instrumentalize the arts to their ends as well.  Chapter 3 then 
details the opposite case: the failed implementation of congressional aesthetics in the 
operation of the NEA.  More specifically, I argue that the NEA controversies of the 
1990s can be traced to the agency’s failure to conform to congressional aesthetics.  Failed 
congressional aesthetics results largely from postmodern art of the 1980s.     
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CHAPTER 2 
BOURDIEU’S AND THROSBY’S CULTURAL CAPITAL: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
MODEL OF THE INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE ARTS 
The notion of instrumentalizing the arts can be traced all the way back to Plato’s 
Republic.  According to Karl Popper, Plato created his ideal state in the Republic as a 
totalitarian one to fix the excesses of Athenian democracy that led to Athens’ defeat to 
Sparta defeat in the Peloponnesian War (Popper, 1966, p. 13).  The Republic was Plato’s 
“call to justice” for its pleonexia (Frank, 2007, p. 445).  A large part of Athenian excess 
was due to the arts, particularly the great epic poet of the Iliad and Odyssey.  Homer was 
central to the paideia, the aristocratic ideal of education in ancient Athens (Jaeger, 1967, 
p. 5).  In Book 10 of the Republic, Plato explores the intersection of politics and the arts 
by having Socrates compose a letter to the Homer, who metonymically represents “art” in 
the Republic.  Socrates rhetorically posits the following question questioning the utility of 
the arts:  If Homeric poetry could improve the state by revealing or reflecting civic 
practices conducive to the happiness and virtue of the citizenry, as components of Plato’s 
ideally virtuous state must do, then what state has benefited from Homer’s art?  
‘Dear Homer, if you are not third from the truth about virtue, a craftsman of a 
phantom, just the one we defined as an imitator, but are also second and able to 
recognize what sorts of practices make human beings better or worse in private 
and in public, tell us which of the cities was better governed thanks to you…?’ 
(1968, p. 10.599d) 
 
Plato thus introduces the notion of the instrumentalization of the arts.  If the arts 
contribute to the virtue of a state, Socrates queries, then why can we not name even one 
state that has received such a contribution?  Plato’s reason is that art does not – and 
possibly cannot – contribute to the virtue of its citizenry.  Homer has been apotheosized 
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(Fig. x), yet his art had a corrupting influence on Athens.  Far from being useful to the 
state, Plato believed that the arts were largely responsible for Athens’ defeat to Sparta.  
Therefore, the arts must be banished from the state. 
 
Figure 1. Archelaus of Priene, Apotheosis of Homer, third century B.C. British Museum 
in London. Marble relief, 24.26 cm x 30.48 cm. 
 
    
In this chapter I develop a socio-economic model of instrumentalization of the 
arts based on Pierre Bourdieu’s and David Throsby’s conceptualizations of cultural 
capital.  The model blends two conceptualizations of cultural capital – an economic one 
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and a sociological one – that are connected by micro-macro linkages.  The economic 
conceptualization of cultural capital is developed by Throsby (1995, 1999, 2001).  A 
repository of cultural and economic value, Throsbeian cultural capital is economic capital 
in the neoclassical sense of the means of production but with a penumbra of cultural 
value.  I argue that Throsby operationalizes his economic conception of cultural capital at 
the macro level of cultural phenomena.  Next I juxtapose Bourdieu’s sociological 
conception of cultural capital with Throsby’s economic conception.  To Bourdieu in 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (1984), where he arguably most 
fully develops the concept, cultural capital might be generally described as “forms of 
cultural knowledge, competences or dispositions” (Johnson, 1993, p. 7).1  I argue that 
Bourdieu operationalizes his conception of cultural capital at the micro level of the 
individual.  Linking these two conceptions of cultural capital together with a micro-
macro framework descriptively models how the arts can be instrumentalized and put in 
service of the state.  I hasten to add that this is a descriptive model; in no way am I 
putting forth a normative model of instrumentalizing the arts.  The modern state has too 
enthusiastically taken up that responsibility as the conclusion will address. 
 
Two Conceptions of Cultural Capital 
 
Bourdieu’s economism. 
 
 Although “Bourdieu denies economism most strongly” (Grenfell & Hardy, 2007, 
p. 4), Bourdieu’s economism continues to elicit a full range of scholarly attention.  Some 
                                                 
1 Complicating matters, Bourdieu himself is not always consistent in his definition of “cultural capital.” 
Further, he sometimes also uses the term “symbolic capital” synonymously with cultural capital—and 
sometimes not synonymously.  The issue of defining Bourdieu’s cultural capital is further addressed below.   
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scholars dislike Bourdieu’s economism.  For example, Crowther (1994) disdains 
Bourdieu’s reduction of the true Kantian aesthetic experience to mere class-based 
distinctions of taste: “Rather than see [taste]—falsely—as constituted by class identity, 
we would ask what is it about the experience which enables it to function in such identity, 
i.e., why it is able to be regarded as a source of ‘symbolic capital’” (pp. 166-167).  
Likewise, Lamont and Lareau (1988) would prefer to constrain Bourdieu’s economism: 
“Because of these incompatibilities between functions and forms of cultural capital, and 
because of the confusion with the original model, there is a need to simplify the latter and 
use the term cultural capital to refer to the performance of a narrower set of functions” (p. 
156).  Some scholars thus disapprove of Bourdieu’s economism.  
 Other scholars approve of Bourdieu’s economism.  Fowler (1997), for example, 
finds comfort in an “equivalence” between Marxian economics and Bourdieu’s sociology 
of culture: “Bourdieu’s method is to use Marx’s critique in another sphere of production 
in the bourgeois period, that of cultural goods” (p. 43).  Similarly, Beasley-Murray 
(2000a) insists: “The argument for cultural capital as capital crucially underpins his 
analysis, even if this fact remains undertheorized in Bourdieu’s work” (p. 102),2 and then 
he attempts to ameliorate Bourdieu’s undertheorized economism.  Still other scholars 
might be best described as amused with Bourdieu’s economism.  Ironically, amid all of 
Bourdieu’s economism, Calhoun (1993) observes: “What Bourdieu’s newer approach to 
capital lacks, then, is an idea of capitalism” (p. 68).  This “tantalizing lacuna” Calhoun 
discovers in Bourdieu’s economism moves Guillory (1997) to search for the “strategic 
                                                 
2 Please note that all italics that appear in quotations in this paper are italicized in the source, unless 
specified otherwise.  
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value” in such an omission: “The very choice of [the concept of capital] to define the 
stakes in the ‘field’ compels us to consider the absence of an account [of capitalism] 
deliberate” (p. 367).  From amusement to approval to dislike, Bourdieu’s economism—in 
particular his conception of cultural capital—continues to evoke a complete range of 
scholarly responses.   
 Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital stands at the crossroads of sociology and 
economics. Gesturing to both academic disciplines, Bourdieu seeks to develop a “general 
economy of practices” (see Bourdieu, 1980) from a sociology of culture perspective.  
Yet, his explicit attempts to employ economics are peculiar.   Capital in modern 
economics quite unambiguously refers to either the means of production (neoclassical 
economics) or a process in time (Austrian economics).  Bourdieu, however, avoids using 
the concept of economic capital in any recognizable sense of modern economics.  Thus, 
capital as such never seems to appear in Bourdieu.   Although Bourdieu’s conception of 
cultural capital stands at the crossroads of sociology and economics, it seems unable to 
commit to either one.   
 I have two purposes in this essay.  My first purpose is to explore the concept of 
cultural capital.  Again, Bourdieu’s main problem is that, despite his penchant for 
economism, capital as such never seems to appear in Bourdieu.  Why does Bourdieu 
choose to employ a conception of capital if he does not employ it in any accepted sense 
of modern economics?  What does the term “capital” mean to Bourdieu?  How precisely 
does Bourdieuan culture capital differ from economic capital?  My second purpose in this 
essay is to examine ways of augmenting Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital.  Is 
there an alternative conception of cultural capital, one that is not economistic but rather 
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truly economic?  How does the alternative relate to Bourdieuan cultural capital?  Can the 
two be linked?  In short, my dual purpose in this essay is to ask the following general 
question: Whither Bourdieuan cultural capital?  Should Bourdieuan cultural capital 
choose sociology, economics, or both? 
 Beasley-Murray’s (2000a) specifies Bourdieu’s research goal in the field of 
cultural production as one of seeking “the determination of the economic within the 
cultural” (p. 105).  I thus begin this essay by discussing an economic conception of 
cultural capital developed primarily by Throsby (1995, 1999, 2001) in cultural 
economics.  A repository of cultural and economic value, Throsbeian cultural capital is 
economic capital in the neoclassical sense of the means of production but with a 
penumbra of cultural value.  I argue that Throsby operationalizes his economic 
conception of cultural capital at the macro level of cultural phenomena.  In the following 
section, I then juxtapose Bourdieu’s economistic conception of cultural capital with 
Throsby’s economic concept.  To Bourdieu in Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste (1984), where he arguably most fully develops the concept, cultural 
capital might be generally described as “forms of cultural knowledge, competences or 
dispositions” (Johnson, 1993, p. 7).3  I argue that Bourdieu operationalizes his 
conception of cultural capital at the level of the individual.  In the final section the two 
conceptions are linked together in a micro-macro relationship in order to construct the 
socio-cultural model of the instrumentalization of the arts.   
 
                                                 
3 Complicating matters, Bourdieu himself is not always consistent in his definition of “cultural capital.” 
Further, he sometimes also uses the term “symbolic capital” synonymously with cultural capital—and 
sometimes not synonymously.  The issue of defining Bourdieu’s cultural capital is further addressed below.   
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Throsby’s economic conception of cultural capital. 
 
 Throsby’s conception of cultural capital is explicitly a theory of economic capital.  
“Cultural capital in an economic sense,” Throsby (2001) writes, “can provide a means of 
representing culture which enables both tangible and intangible manifestations of culture 
to be articulated as long-lasting stores of value and providers of benefits for individuals 
and groups” (p. 44).   Serving as a repository of value, that is, as a stock, and facilitating 
the flow of cultural services are the two primary functions of Throsbeian cultural capital.  
“[Stock] refers to the quantity of such capital in existence at a given time…This capital 
stock gives rise over time to a flow of services which may be consumed or may be used to 
produce further goods and services” (Throsby, 2001, p. 46).  Throsbeian cultural capital 
thus serves as the means of cultural production and is thus thoroughly economic capital.   
Throsby, however, distinguishes his conception of cultural capital from other 
forms of economic capital (Throsby, 1995, pp. 202-203; 1999, pp. 3-7; 2001, pp. 43-47).  
Throsby identifies four different types of capital: physical capital, which is the “stock of 
real goods;” human capital, which is the “embodiment of skills and experience in 
people;” natural capital, which is the “stock of renewable and nonrenewable resources 
provided by nature;” and cultural capital, which is the “stock of cultural value embodied 
in an asset” that influences “human progress generally and economic transactions 
specifically.”  By distinguishing his conception of cultural capital from these other 
conceptions of economic capital, Throsby puts his conception on a par with them.  
Throsby in this way legitimates his conception cultural capital as economic capital.    
Throsby elaborates on his conception of cultural capital by distinguishing between 
two types of cultural capital.  First, there is tangible cultural capital, such as “buildings, 
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structures, sites and locations endowed with cultural significance, and artworks and 
artifacts existing as private goods, such as paintings, sculptures, and other objects.”  
Second, there is intangible cultural capital, which is the “set of ideas, practices, beliefs, 
traditions and values which serve to identify and bind together a given group of 
people…together with the stock of artworks existing in the public domain as public 
goods.”  Each form of capital Throsby identifies exists in an objectified or embodied 
form.  Even intangible cultural capital is reified to a certain extent in the stock of 
artworks.  Much like the intangible and tangible aspects of nature (an analogy Throsby 
himself repeatedly makes), Throsbeian cultural capital is a stock of objects and embodied 
ideas and the services that flow from them.    
 An important distinction in Throsby’s conception of cultural capital is between 
“cultural value and economic value.”  “Cultural capital gives rise to both cultural and 
economic value, [while] ‘ordinary’ capital provides only economic value” (Throsby, 
2001, p. 45).  In tangible cultural capital, “cultural value may give rise to economic 
value.”  For example,   
The asset [e.g., heritage building] may have economic value, which derives 
simply from its physical existence as a building and irrespective of its cultural 
worth.  But the economic value of the asset is likely to be augmented, perhaps 
significantly so, because of its cultural value. (Throsby, 1999, p. 8) 
 
In contrast to tangible cultural capital, intangible cultural capital cannot be exchanged 
and thus cannot give rise directly to economic value.  Rather, the value of intangible 
cultural capital flows from it:  
The stock of existing music and literature, for example, or the stock of cultural 
mores and beliefs, or the stock of language, has immense cultural value, but no 
economic value since they cannot be traded as assets.  Rather, the flows of 
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services to which these stocks give rise yield both cultural and economic value. 
(Throsby, 1999, p. 8) 
 
(Throsby’s distinction between cultural value and economic value rather startlingly 
invokes Marx’s distinction between use and exchange value.)  The creation of cultural 
value and economic value together demonstrate the productive function of Throsbeian 
cultural capital as economic capital. 
The macro level: cultural policy and the stock and flow of cultural capital 
 
Throsby’s conception of cultural capital is consistent with many common notions 
of the existence of cultural objects and artifacts to a particular society.  At the founding of 
the National Endowment for the Arts in 1965 in the United States, for example, Henry 
Hyde referred to cultural property as a “commons,” that is, “the ‘creative wealth of the 
past’ that now ‘exists in the present’ and on which we continue to build artistically and 
intellectually” (quoted in Campbell, 1999, p. 5).  Similarly, in 2001, Center for Arts and 
Culture, an arts policy think-tank in Washington, D.C., conceived of America’s culture as 
“a national resource, the accumulated capital of America’s ingenuity and creativity” 
(CAC, 2001, p. 180).  Morato’s “culture society” (2003) also seems germane to 
Throsby’s conception of cultural capital:  “In this new cultural configuration, culture 
represents a significant resource within the general economic and political sphere” (pp. 
250-251).   
Other commentators link stocks of cultural capital to the concept of nationhood.  
Most significantly, Bourdieu in his essay “Manet and the Institutionalization of Anomie” 
(Bourdieu, 1993b) argues that Academic art in nineteenth-century France served a state 
purpose of establishing juste milieu: “…it is quite clear that the valorization of academic 
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art is inscribed in the cultural restoration undertaken after the crises of the Revolution and 
the Empire, through which political regimes, seeking legitimacy, attempted to recreate a 
consensus around an eclectic culture of a juste mileu” (Bourdieu, 1993b).  “Art, 
architecture, literature, theatre, dance and music,” Radbourne and Fraser ” (1996) 
similarly write, “provide some of the most translatable and permanent media for the 
expression of national identity” (p. 9).  Cultural capital in this usage can contribute to 
such areas as international prestige, the preservation and reinforcement of cultural 
identity, education of the young and the “worthy poor,” and the preservation of cultural 
evidence to foster culture (Shubik, 1999).  Quinn (1998) notices a similar realization in 
Great Britain: “In the period of European restoration which took place after World War 
Two, the notion of ‘culture’ assumed new significance [for Great Britain] as the ‘essence 
of a society’s identity’” (p. 75).  Therefore, insofar as Throsby is referring to a pre-
existing stock of objects, be they artworks, national heritage, and so on, he is 
operationalizing his conception of cultural capital at the macro level of cultural policy 
and other “systems-level” cultural phenomena.  
In fact, Throsby has conceptualized a set of cultural policies for the “sustainable 
development of cultural capital” (Throsby, 1995, 2001).   Throsby’s set of cultural 
policies is based on the “whole-systems” approach that he borrows from ecological 
economics.  “We could bring the economy (as defined by economists) and culture (as 
defined by cultural theorists) together in a single system where interaction and feedback 
effects were acknowledged, and where in particular the dynamics were made explicit” 
(Throsby, 1995, p. 200).  Sustainable development of cultural capital “marries the ideas 
of sustainable economic development, meaning development that will not slow down or 
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wither away but will be, in some sense, self-perpetuating, and ecological sustainability, 
meaning the preservation and enhancement of a range of environmental values through 
maintenance of ecosystems in the natural world” (Throsby, 2001, p. 54).  Six principles 
guide Throsby’s set of cultural policies in support of the sustainable development of 
cultural capital (Throsby, 2001, pp. 54-57): 
1. Material and non-material wellbeing: “The production of material benefits in 
the form of direct utility to consumers, deriving form these economics and 
cultural value sources.” 
 
2. Intergenerational equity and dynamic efficiency: “Equity of access to cultural 
capital can be analysed in the same way as equity in the intergenerational 
distribution of benefits from any other sort of capital.”  
 
3. Intragenerational equity: “The rights of the present generation to fairness in 
access to cultural resources and to the benefits flowing from cultural capital, 
viewed across social classes, income groups, locational categories and so on.” 
 
4. Maintenance of diversity: “A greater diversity of resources will lead to the 
creation of more varied and more culturally valuable artistic works in the 
future.” 
 
5. Precautionary principle: “Decisions which may lead to irreversible change 
should be approached with extreme caution and from a strongly risk-averse 
position, because of imponderability of the consequences of such decisions.” 
 
6. Maintenance of cultural systems and recognition of interdependence: “No part 
of any system exists independently of other parts.” 
 
This set of cultural policies are designed to avoid “short-term or temporary solutions that 
do not address fundamental issues, and also a concern with producing self-generating or 
self-perpetuating characteristics in systems” (Throsby, 1995, p. 201).  Thus these policies 
operate on cultural capital at the macro level of cultural phenomena.   
The weakness of Throsby’s macro-level conception of cultural capital is that, like 
many macroeconomic concepts, it neglects individual interaction.  We recognize in 
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Throsby’s conception the group of artifacts and embodiments that exist in any modern 
culture, such as historical buildings, works of art, public rituals, and shared beliefs.   
Throsby’s conception of cultural capital in this way conforms to our intuitions and 
experience of modern culture.  The problem, however, lies in Throsby’s neglect of the 
origin and formation of cultural capital.  Throsbeian cultural capital exists exogenously, 
that is, as given, already created, always maintained, and perhaps even automatically 
augmented.  But where does cultural capital come from?  How is it maintained?  How is 
it acquired and used in social interactions?  Most answers to these questions can only be 
answered at the level of the individual and social interaction.  Only individuals can 
participate in transactions.  Only individuals can create art.  Only individuals can 
experience art.  The exogenous treatment of any phenomena is mute to these vital 
considerations at the level of the individual.  And Throsby’s conception of cultural of 
capital as economic capital does not provide answers to these micro-level questions.4   
Bourdieu’s economistic conception of cultural capital. 
 
 Bourdieu’s general conception of capital is economistic.  His conception gestures 
toward economics, but ultimately it is incompatible with modern neoclassical or Austrian 
economic notions of capital as the means of production or a process in time, respectively.  
“Capital,” Bourdieu writes in “The Forms of Capital” (1986), “is accumulated labor (in 
                                                 
4 In prior work, Throsby sees works of art as “cultural goods” endogenously consumed at the level of the 
individual.  For example, he identifies “the endogenization of tastes” in the individual consumption of 
cultural goods: “The arts can be further distinguished in this theory by their being addictive, in the sense 
that an increase in an individual’s present consumption of the arts will increase her future consumption” 
(Throsby, 1994, p. 3).  The endogenization of tastes thus implies increasing returns to scale with the 
consumption of cultural goods, increasing value at the individual level that can then contribute to the 
creation and maintenance of the stock of cultural capital at the system level.  Unfortunately, Throsby did 
not incorporate the endogenization of tastes in his later work on cultural capital and does not develop the 
theme. 
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its materialized form or its ‘incorporated,’ embodied form) which, when appropriated on 
private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate 
social energy in the form of reified or living labor” (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 241-242).   
Thus, rather than basing his conception on neoclassical or Austrian economics, 
Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital most closely approximates a Marxian one.   
 Marxian capital theory is at least in part based on the labor theory of value.  
Borrowing from John Locke and Adam Smith, Marx writes in Capital (1867/1978): “The 
value of labour-power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the 
labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, of this 
special article” (p. 339).  Capital, then, is formed from the surplus value that the capitalist 
owner appropriates from the laborer: “Capital is dead labour, that vampire-like, only lives 
by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (pp. 362-363).  In 
other words, capitalist accumulation is facilitated by the surplus value capitalists extract 
from purchased labor-power.   
 Bourdieu, however, misappropriates this aspect of Marxian capital theory.  
Beasley-Murray (2000a) keenly observes that Bourdieu is providing not a definition of 
capital but rather a definition of value.5  “For Marx, this process whereby capital is 
produced is the production process itself; in contrast, what Bourdieu outlines here is 
rather a theory of (unequal) distribution of capital effected through appropriation” (p. 
105).  Bourdieu misappropriates Marx in Capital by generally defining value, not capital, 
as the accumulated labor embodied in the social agent.  The incomplete Marxian 
                                                 
5 Also see Beasley-Murray (2000b) for an earlier, online draft version of his paper with a more extensive 
textual analysis of Bourdieu’s and Marx’s differences in conceptualizing capital.  
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definition of capital Bourdieu offers in “The Forms of Capital” is thus rendered almost 
useless as a base on which to construct a conceptualization of cultural capital.  
  Fortunately, Bourdieu does not base his conception of cultural capital on his 
(mis)conceptualization of capital.6  Later in “The Forms of Capital” Bourdieu specifies 
three types of cultural capital:7 (1) embodied cultural capital, which “in the form of what 
is called culture, cultivation, Bildung, presupposes a process of em-bodiment [sic], 
incorporation” (p. 244); (2) objectified cultural capital, which is “defined only in relation 
with cultural capital in its embodied form;” and (3) institutionalized cultural capital, 
which is academic qualifications (p. 246).  According to Holt (1997), Bourdieu’s 
typology of cultural capital allows for both virtual, abstract cultural capital and concrete, 
particularized cultural capital: “Cultural capital exists both as a single abstracted form 
that has only a virtual existence, and as many different realized particular forms as the 
abstracted form becomes instantiated in social life” (p. 96).  Further, cultural value also 
does not seem to be based strictly on labor.  For example, Fowler (1997) notes: “Hence 
Bourdieu argues that the material value only represents the outer husk of art.  Its inner 
kernel is collective veneration of spirituality and genius” (p. 79).  Bourdieu’s typology of 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, some of Bourdieu’s commentators replicate his misappropriation of Marxian capital 
theory.  Frow (1996), for example, describes Bourdieuan cultural capital as follows: “knowledge is stored 
labour which is productive” (p. 96). 
7 The definitional problems of Bourdieuan cultural capital are manifold.  Some commentators distinguish 
between cultural capital and symbolic capital.  Johnson (1993), for example, defines symbolic capital as the 
“degree of accumulated prestige, celebrity, consecration or honour and is founded on a dialectic of 
knowledge (conaissance) and recognition (reconnaissance)” and cultural capital as “forms of cultural 
knowledge, competences or dispositions.” (p. 7).  Others do not distinguish between cultural and symbolic 
capital (e.g., Frow, 1995, footnote 12).  Still others define cultural capital for Bourdieu: “We propose to 
define cultural capital as institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, 
preferences, formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion” 
(Lamont & Lareau, 1988, p. 156).  In this essay I attempt to work through only Bourdieu’s concept of 
cultural capital as he expressed n Distinction (1984) as “the aesthetic disposition.” 
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cultural capital seems much closer to satisfying Beasley-Murray’s criticism because it 
implies the distribution more than production with value independent of labor-power.   
 Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital is not an economic 
definition of capital.  Rather, it is an economistic one.  It is economistic in that it gestures 
towards (Marxian) economics, but in no way does it conform to any modern, technical 
definition of economic capital, be it neoclassical, Austrian, or even Marxian.   
Apparently, Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital is uniquely his own.  Why does 
Bourdieu choose to employ a conception of capital if he does not employ it in any 
accepted sense of modern economics?  What does the term “capital” mean to Bourdieu?  
To answer these questions we must turn generally to Bourdieu’s sociology and 
specifically to Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (1984), one of the 
masterworks of twentieth-century empirical sociology.   
Bourdieu’s sociology of culture and theory of cultural production. 
 
 Bourdieu’s sociology of culture emphasizes the “primacy of relations” that is 
embodied in the concept of field.  In its application to art and the field of cultural 
production, it is doubly so in what Randall Johnson calls in his introduction to The Field 
of Cultural Production (1993, p. 9) “radical contextualization.”  Bourdieu writes in “The 
Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed” (1993a):  
The boundary of the field [of cultural production] is a stake of struggles, and the 
social scientist’s task is…to describe a state (long-lasting or temporary) of these 
struggles and therefore of the frontier delimiting the territory held by the 
competing agents (pp. 42-43; emphasis in the original).   
 
Bourdieu’s concept of field “grounds the agent’s action in objective social relations, 
without succumbing to the mechanistic determinism of many forms of sociological and 
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‘Marxian’ analysis” (Johnson, 1993, p. 2).  Bourdieu with Lacquant (1992) maintain that 
“To think in terms of field is to think relationally:  In analytic terms, a field may be 
defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (p. 97; 
emphasis in the original).  The field thus is analyzed in terms of objective relations; more 
specifically, a field is a space of power relations.  It is “simultaneously a space of conflict 
and competition…and the power to decree the hierarchy and conversion rates between all 
forms of authority in the fields of power” (Wacquant, 1992, pp. 17-18).  Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice for the sociology of culture finally “is built on the foundation of the 
great materialist classifications of social structures” (Fowler, 1996, p. 9).     
 Bourdieu’s theory of cultural production consists of the triad of the field of 
cultural production, the habitus, and cultural capital.  “In approaching the cultural 
production of art,” Grenfell and Hardy summarize in Art Rules (2007), “Bourdieu’s 
concepts of habitus and field work together to simultaneously represent the cognitive 
construction of reality and give meaning to the actions that make up the field” (p. 29).  
First of all, the field of cultural production includes “the set of social conditions for the 
production, circulation and consumption of symbolic goods” (Johnson, 1993, p. 9).  Thus 
the cultural field encompasses the primacy of relations in cultural production, again, “the 
area par excellence of clashes between the dominant factions of the dominant class…” 
(Bourdieu, 1993d, p. 102; emphasis in the original).  The analyses of cultural fields can 
explore questions as fundamental as What is art? and Who is the artist?  For example, in 
“The Production of Belief: Contribution to an Economy of Symbolic Goods” (1993d), 
Bourdieu inquires into the production of belief and asks, “Who creates the ‘creator’?”.  
His answer the “circle of belief” that constitutes the field of production, understood as the 
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system of objective relations between these agents or institutions and as the site of the 
struggles for the monopoly of the power to consecrate, in which the value of works of art 
and belief in that value are continuously generated” (p. 78).  “Since fields are objective 
structures,” Danto (1999) observes, “the question of what is art and who are artists are 
themselves objective matters, and Bourdieu has sought to put in place the kind of science 
required for understanding both: it is an historical science of cultural fields” (p. 216). 
 Habitus, Bourdieu’s other central analytic concept, exists within a field as 
“structured, structuring dispositions”: 
Theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to positivist materialism, that the 
objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively records, and, contrary to 
intellectualist idealism, that the principle of this construction is the system of 
structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice 
and is always oriented towards practical functions (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 52). 
 
Habitus is dynamic.  “Social structure is not typological, but dynamical.  This, ultimately, 
is the powerful message in the phrase ‘structured structuring structures’” (Dyke, 1999, p. 
211).  Habitus serves many functions in the logic of practice.  Habitus is a repository for 
history:  “[Habitus] ensures the active presence of past experiences” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 
54).  Habitus reflects power: “Property and properties—expressions of the habitus 
perceived through the categories of the habitus—symbolize the differential capacity to 
appropriate, that is, capital and social power…” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 140).  Habitus 
approximates ideology: “Bourdieu submits that the correspondence between social and 
mental structures fulfills crucial political functions.  Symbolic systems are not 
instruments of knowledge; they are also instruments of domination” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 
13).  In summary, with habitus “Bourdieu wants to re-establish a sociology based on the 
study of objective as well as subjective possibilities” (Fowler, 1996, p. 9).  Bourdieu’s 
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concept of habitus incorporates “a notion of the agent—which structuralism had excluded 
from social analysis—without falling into the idealism of Romantic conceptions of the 
artist as creator (or subject) which still informs much literary and art criticism” (Johnson, 
1993, p. 2). 
 It is arguably in Distinction where Bourdieu develops his theory of cultural 
consumption and production most elegantly and applies his concepts of the field of 
cultural production, cultural habitus, and cultural capital most forcefully (Grenfell & 
Hardy, 2007, Chapter 3).  Fowler (1994) describes the main idea of Distinction as 
follows: “Elaborating how the ‘good taste’ which privileges form consists of a complex 
web of identities and oppositions, all molded by class habitus” (p. 144).  The field of 
cultural production in Distinction is the location of “competitive struggle,” or “the form 
of class struggle which the dominated classes allow to be imposed on them when they 
accept the stakes offered by the dominant classes” (p. 165).  Habitus in Distinction is 
“both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgments and the system of 
classification (principium divisionis) of these practices” (p. 170).  Alternatively, Grenfell 
and Hardy (2007) maintain,  
The main message of La Distinction is that this aesthetic extends to all aspects of 
life: what we eat, how we talk, our opinions, what we wear, how we use our knife 
and fork.  In short, a certain habitus implies a certain lifestyle.  And habitus is a 
kind of incarnation of social history, actualized at a certain point in time, and 
within the field in which it finds itself, realized as a particular instance within a 
specific field.  (p. 45)  
 
In short, Distinction is about social distinction. 
 Bourdieu employs cultural capital in Distinction is “the aesthetic sense as the 
sense of distinction” as shaped by the cultural habitus. Bourdieu writes:  
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The aesthetic disposition is one dimension of a distant, self-assured relation to the 
world and to others which presupposes objective assurance and distance…But it 
is also a distinctive expression of a privileged position in social space whose 
distinctive value is objectively established in its relationship to expressions 
generated from different conditions. (p. 56) 
 
Cultural capital, however, is more than an aesthetic disposition that distinguishes its 
holder; it is also an instrument of domination (see Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977) or, 
expressed more gently, a device of elitism:  “Bourdieu’s theory [of cultural capital] posits 
more than an interest in, and appreciation of, culture.  For him elites possess considerable 
artistic knowledge and a distinctive aesthetic outlook that is difficult for others to obtain” 
(Ostrower, 1998, p. 46).  Thus Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital in Distinction is 
essentially a class-based8 epistemology of tastes:  “To the socially recognized hierarchy 
of the arts, and within each of them, of genres, schools or periods, corresponds a social 
hierarchy of consumers.  This predisposes tastes to function as markers of class” (pp. 1-
2).  And the class consumption of cultural capital gives rise to legitimacy: “Thus, nothing 
more rigorously distinguishes the different classes than the disposition objectively 
demanded by the legitimate consumption of legitimate works” (p. 40).  As Grenfell and 
Hardy (2007) summarize, “aesthetic practice – attendance at museums, theatres, art 
galleries, concerts, reading, listening to music, lectures, and so on – is bound up with a 
whole universe of material objects – furniture, clothes, painting, books – making up a 
certain ‘cultural capital’, which has symbolic value in the way it ‘buys’ social distinction” 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that Bourdieu’s and Marx’s notions of class are not the same: “If there exists a form of 
capital which is specifically symbolic or cultural, the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption 
of this capital presupposes the division of society into groups that can be called classes.  Bourdieu’s 
sociology assumes such a division, but it does not assume that an economic account of classes is sufficient 
in itself [as does Marx].” (Guillory, 1993, p. viii) 
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(p. 44).  Perhaps “nothing more rigorously distinguishes” Bourdieu’s economistic 
conception of cultural capital from Throsby’s economic conception of cultural capital.  
The micro level: individual acquisition, conversion, and  
reproduction of cultural capital. 
 
 “What differences make a difference?” Dyke (1999, p. 194) asks.  What benefits 
come from “distinction through cultural capital” confer?  Or, expressed reflexively, why 
does Bourdieu choose to employ a conception of capital if he does not employ it in the 
sense of modern economics?  What does the term “capital” mean to Bourdieu?    
“Bourdieu’s general answer…is that various forms of capital—social, cultural, and 
economic—make a difference as individuals pursue trajectories and assume positions 
within a generalized social space” (Dyke, 1999, p. 194).  A major theme of Distinction 
might be summarized as demonstrating that the social interactions in the form of 
individual acquisition, conversion, and reproduction of cultural capital enable individuals 
to adjust their position-taking in the social space.  Bourdieu’s conception of cultural 
capital is therefore a micro-level theory of social interaction.         
 First, there are acquisitions of cultural capital.  Bourdieuan cultural capital is 
acquired individually at the micro level.  Individuals are not naturally endowed with 
cultural capital; rather, they socially acquires the cultural capital of its habitus as  “the 
product of upbringing and education” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 1) or “domestic transmission 
and scholarly culture” (Fowler, 1997, p. 47).  Artistic competence, the aesthetic 
disposition, or the individual accumulation of cultural capital “is the result of a long 
process of inculcation which begins (or not) in the family, often in conformity with its 
level of economic, academic and cultural capital, and is reinforced by the educational 
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system. It also involves prolonged exposure to works of art” (Johnson, 1993, p. 23).  
Thus the “two modalities of cultural competence” are “inherited capital,” which comes 
from individuals experience within their family, and “acquired capital,” which comes 
from individual effort in higher education.  From these intra-family and extra-familial 
social interactions individuals acquire cultural capital is the derivative result.     
 Cultural capital is also instrumentally involved in specific social interactions that 
Bourdieu calls conversions and reproduction strategies in the social space.  On the one 
hand, conversions change capital “held in one form to another, more accessible, more 
profitable or more legitimate form” and “tends to induce a transformation of asset 
structure” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 131).  Cultural capital is transformed into economic capital 
such that “the volume and composition of capital give specific form and value to the 
determinations which the other factors (age, sex, place of residence etc.) impose on 
practices” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 107).9  On the other hand, reproduction strategies are “the 
set of outwardly very different practices whereby individuals or families tend, 
unconsciously or consciously, to maintain or improve their position in the class structure” 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 125).  Individually acquired cultural capital thus begins to materialize 
in social life through conversions and reproduction strategies. 
                                                 
9 Frow (1995) argues that Bourdieu’s conversion argument is “incomplete”: “In the first place because the 
conversion of capitals can take place only under certain conditions and at certain restricted levels of the 
market, and in the second place because conversion is not reciprocal (it is possible to convert cultural into 
economic capital, but not vice versa)” (p. 40).  Bourdieu anticipated such a criticism and offers the 
following rebuttal: “‘Economic’ capital cannot guarantee the specific profits offered by the field—and by 
the same token the ‘economic’ profits that they will often bring in time— 
unless it is reconverted into symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 148). 
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 Conversions and reproduction strategies occur along trajectories in social life.  
Trajectories are the “volume and structure of capital, defined synchronically and 
diachronically,” and result from family influences and reflexively the trajectory itself:  
The correlation between a practice and social origin (measured by the father’s 
position, the real value of which may have suffered a decline concealed by 
constant nominal value) is the resultant of two effects (which may either reinforce 
or offset each other): on the one hand, the inclusion effect of directly exerted by 
the family or the original conditions of existence; on the other hand, the specific 
effect of social trajectory, that is, the effects of social rise or decline on 
dispositions and opinions, position of origin being, in this logic, merely the 
starting point of a trajectory, the reference whereby the slope of the social career 
is defined (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 111). 
 
The result is a three-dimensional space for the conditions of production of habitus 
consisting of (1) the volume of capital, (2) composition of capital, and (3) change in these 
two properties over time (manifested by past and potential trajectory in social space)” 
(Bourdieu, 1984, p. 114).  Bourdieu thus attempts to hypostatize cultural capital through 
the conversion and reproduction strategies of cultural capital along trajectories in the 
social space.  
 It now should be evident that Bourdieu never intended that his conception of 
cultural capital be construed in any technical sense of modern economics.  In fact, 
Bourdieuan cultural capital might not even be economistic.  Rather, Bourdieu’s 
conception of cultural capital seems to be reaching back to its etymological roots in the 
Latin caput, which can mean life, existence, rights, or status.10  As Fowler (1994) 
observes, Bourdieuan cultural capital is a pre-capitalist notion that does not necessarily 
relate to the modern sense of economic capital or even Marxian creation of capital 
                                                 
10 Some Ciceronian examples illustrate this meaning of caput: (a) capiti diminui—to lose caput, to suffer a 
loss of status; capitis minor—loss of caput, status. 
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through surplus value (contra Beasley-Murray): “For the rest, the major motivation is the 
acquisition of symbolic capital.  This is not unrelated to power or even material class 
advantages, but it is independent of surplus extraction via market or industrial profit” (p. 
136).  Therefore, Bourdieuan cultural capital refers to individual power, legitimacy, and 
distinction in the social space.    
 Bourdieu, then, is using cultural capital in another Marxian sense: Capital as a 
social relation.  For Marx, “capital is not a thing, but rather a definite set of social 
relations which belong to a definite historical period in human development, and which 
give the things enmeshed within these social relations their specific content” (Shaikh, 
1990, p. 73).  Marxian capital in this sense is the objectification of the relations between 
the capitalists and laborers, or what Bourdieu terms “objectified cultural capital” in his 
tripartite typology.  Marx writes in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1888/1988) 
[sic]: 
In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion 
is the proletariat, the modern working class, develop—a class of labourers, who 
live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their 
labour increases capital. (p. 60; sic) 
 
Syllogistically, Marx concludes: “Capital, therefore, is not a personal, it is a social 
power” (p. 68).  Further, just as cultural habitus and cultural capital are intimately related 
in Bourdieu through conversions and reproduction strategies, class and capital relate to 
each in Marx’s conceptualization of the capitalist epoch:  “The reproduction of any given 
society in turn requires not only the reproduction of its people, but also of the things they 
need for their existence, and of the social relations which surround both people and 
things” (Shaikh, 1990, p. 73).  Individual power, legitimacy, domination through social 
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relations—these are the objectification of Bourdieuan cultural capital via a Marxian 
maieutic.  Therefore, Bourdieu’s economistic conception of cultural capital refers not to 
the means of production or a process in time; rather, it refers to social interaction.  
Micro-Macro Linkages: 
A Socio-Economic Model of the Instrumentalization of the Arts 
 
   Recent theoretical work in sociology has developed micro-macro linkages to bi-
directionally connect micro-level phenomena to macro-level phenomena.  Previously, 
reductionism was the most common theoretical move between multi-level phenomena, 
and it still remains popular.  Reductionism, particular economic reductionism, has always 
been controversial.  But now, Alexander and Giesen (1987) assert, “the conflict over 
reduction is replaced by the search for linkage” (p. 3).  Unfortunately, micro-macro 
linkages have not completely replaced reductionism, but they offer a tempting theoretical 
alternative.  And, more to the point, micro-macro linkages might provide a useful 
theoretical device for connecting Bourdieu’s micro-level conception of cultural capital to 
Throsby’s macro-level conception of cultural capital in a socio-economic model of the 
instrumentalization of the arts.  
 An important possible criticism must first be addressed.  It might reasonably be 
argued that cultural capital in conjunction with Bourdieu’s concept of field might itself 
encompass a macro conception of cultural capital, thus obviating Throsby’s cultural 
capital being offered here.  Consider, for example, the following rendering that seems to 
strongly argue for a micro-macro connection within Bourdieuan theory, which Bourdieu 
himself seems to intimate in “The Market of Symbolic Goods” (1993c), when he 
distinguishes “the field of restricted production” (i.e., high art) vs. “field of large-scale 
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cultural production” (i.e., popular art) (p. 115).  Based on the Bourdieu’s formula in 
Distinction (1984, p. 101) that practice = [(habitus) (capital)] + field, Grenfell and 
Hardy (2007) correctly map the relation between field and habitus: “On the one side, 
there is the cognitive construction of reality (habitus) by those whose total actions make 
up the field; on the other, there is a structured world of sense and meaning, which is 
already representing the ‘immanent logic,’ indeed necessity, of that field” (p. 29).  Yet, 
even in this rendering, we can see that it is still the habitus is still the generative force in 
the relationship.  The habitus supplies the content on the field’s “immanent logic;” 
therefore, it is still a subjective, micro conceptualization.  Throsby’s conceptualization 
contains no such subjective, micro link.  Throsbeian cultural capital is exogenously 
constituted, while Bourdieu’s cultural capital is endogenously constituted.   
 The socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts linking 
Throsby’s and Bourdieu’s conceptions of cultural capital rests on Coleman’s micro-
macro interpretation of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(Coleman, 1987, 1994).  As shown in Fig. x below,  Coleman describes his interpretation 
as the “internal analysis of system behavior” that is useful for “examining processes 
internal to the system, involving component parts, or units at a level below that of the 
system” (Coleman, 1994, p. 2).  The kind of behavior Coleman’s model is appropriate for 
is emergent behavior (i.e., Weberian methodological individualism), not aggregated 
behavior: “The interaction among individuals is seen to result in emergent phenomena at 
the system level, that is, phenomena that were neither intended nor predicted by the 
individuals” (Coleman, 1994, p. 5).  Coleman’s model seems particularly promising by 
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framing the Throsbeian macro-level cultural capital as the “emergent phenomena” from 
the Bourdieuan micro-level cultural capital, thus connecting the two conceptions.    
 
Figure 2: Coleman-Weber model of Protestant religious doctrine determining capitalist 
economic organization 
 
 The key to Coleman-Weber model framework is that, as Julia Gricheva (2010) 
notes in terms of cultural diplomacy, a state’s interest is primarily concerned with the 
“high arts, as opposed to popular culture and mass cultural products… Art always has 
been an expression of national cultures and traditions, which is why arts play such an 
important role in the cultural diplomacy practices” (p. 171).  And the notion of the high 
arts as the “expression of national cultures and traditions” very closely approximates 
Throsby’s economic conceptualization of cultural capital.  This is the stock of cultural 
capital that, on the one hand, flows at the macro level into cultural diplomacy because 
these are the objects that represent a nation and its traditions.  On the other hand, this 
stock and flow of cultural capital also fits into the “augmented public access to art” 
(Kammen, 2006, p. xi) and around the world.  Bourdieu’s sociological conceptualization 
of cultural capital, then, fits into the framework at the micro level.  As people experience 
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art, they acquire and reproduce cultural capital, feeding into the aims of cultural 
diplomacy.  Art has therefore been instrumentalized in this cultural-capital framework as 
it serves the state’s interests at both the micro and macro levels.  In the U.S., it was 
assumed that “art and artists would serve the needs of country in terms of propaganda and 
international public relations” (Wallis, 2002, p. 171).  These four nodes together 
constitute a socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts.    
 
Figure 3: A socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts based on 
Bourdieu’s and Throsby’s conceptualizations of cultural capital 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Again, I must insist that this socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of 
the arts is a descriptive – not a normative – model of how the state uses the arts to support 
and promote its interests.  Bourdieu, Throsby, and most of all Plato, most likely would 
have unfavorable reactions to their ideas on cultural capital and the arts being used in this 
way. But the socio-economic model does not seek to justify the state’s use of art or 
instruct on how to use art; rather, it demonstrates how the state uses the arts to advance its 
interests.  The strength of Throsby’s conception of cultural capital at the macro level of 
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cultural phenomena is his identification of an existing stock of tangible and intangible 
cultural capital that characterizes any modern culture, such as historical buildings, works 
of art, public rituals, and shared beliefs.   The weakness of Throsby’s conception is its 
exogeneity.  Throsby’s conception of cultural capital does not address questions such as, 
where does cultural capital come from?  How is it maintained?  How is it acquired and 
used in individual interactions?  Most of answers to these questions can only be answered 
at the level of social interaction, which is precisely the strength of Bourdieu’s conception 
of cultural capital.  In Bourdieu’s concept, individuals either inherit or acquire cultural 
capital and then employ it in conversions and reproduction strategies to improve their 
position-takings in the social space.  Throsby’s conception also strengthens Bourdieu’s as 
the individual use of Bourdieuan cultural capital presumes that a larger, society-wide 
stock of cultural capital exists to develop the aesthetic disposition on the individual level.  
If a stock of cultural capital consisting of historical buildings, works of art, public rituals, 
and shared beliefs did not exist, then individuals could not achieve distinction.  Throsby’s 
and Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural capital thus form a micro-macro dichotomy that lies 
at the heart of this socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts. 
 The instrumentalization of the arts invokes Foucault’s notion of 
“governmentality.”  To Foucault, the modern state subsumes most everything to its 
interests:  
It is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and 
redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the 
public versus the private, and so on; thus the state can only be understood in its 
survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality. 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 103)  
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If governmentality predominates in the modern state to ensure the state’s survival, then 
the instrumentalization of the arts to serve its interests represents a logical relationship 
between politics and the arts.  Indeed, as Tony Bennett writes of nineteenth-century Great 
Britain, “the mechanisms through which culture was distributed entailed both its 
bureaucratisation and its subordination to a utilitarian calculus” (Bennett, 1995, p. 884).  
Governmentality and the state’s instrumentalization of the arts could result in relatively 
benign applications (e.g., Shockley, 2004). Or it could lead to nefarious uses of the arts.  
Bennett (2000) demonstrates how the British state utilization of the arts as a civilizing 
agent to regulate the poor and maintain order.  Governmentality and the 
instrumentalization of the arts to a large degree must have motivated the Nazi’s 
“degenerate art” exhibitions in order to protect what Max Nordau called in 1892 “the 
vanishing of ideals in art” (Nordau, 1998, p. 799) and to preserve the “long anti-modern 
tradition” in German culture (Nicholas, 1994, p. 7).  The didacticism of Soviet socialist 
realism also involved the government’s instrumentalization of the arts.  “The truthfulness 
and historical concreteness of the artistic portrayal,” Andrei Zdhanov said in his 1934 
speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers, “should be combined with the ideological 
remoulding and education of the toiling people in the spirit of socialism” (Zdhanov, 
2003, p. 428).  Lee (1997) and Brustein (1992) found hints of socialist realism in 
governments’ relations to the arts in Anglo-American culture.  “Once subsidized artistic 
activity becomes subject to government manipulation, we resemble the official culture of 
Stalinist Russia” (Brustein, 1992, p. 43).  In its more malignant forms, governmentality 
and the instrumentalization of the arts compromises art and leaves it “committed,” to 
borrow Adorno’s pejorative term (see Adorno, 1982).  
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CHAPTER 3 
CONGRESSIONAL AESTHETICS AND SINO-AMERICAN CULTURAL 
DIPLOMACY 
An implicit agreement underlay postwar government support for the arts in the 
United States: the federal government would support the arts, but it would do so only if 
the arts were useful for American foreign policy.  This implicit agreement based on the 
instrumentalization of the arts I call “congressional aesthetics.”  An exemplar of 
congressional aesthetics for the federal government is the case of Sino-American cultural 
diplomacy in the Cold War.  Both to China and the US, the arts were instrumentalized as 
cultural capital in their largely successful efforts in cultural policy in the 1950s.  Michael 
Sullivan asserts in his seminal book The Meeting of Eastern and Western Art (1989) that 
East-West encounters in art have been occurring for half of a millennium: “The active 
dialogue between Western and Far Eastern art began after 1500 [and in many instances 
developed into] an active, generative force” (p. 4).  Catholic missionaries initiated the 
first contact: “The Jesuits formed the spearhead of European cultural penetration of 
China, as they did in Japan” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 41).  Howard Rogers narrates the case of 
Giuseppe Castiglione, the Jesuit missionary to China in the early seventeenth century.  
Renamed Lang Shining by the Qianlong emperor, Castiglione was a painter in service to 
the Qing court.  “The function of court painters was, in a general sense, to make manifest 
and to consecrate the glory of the emperor and his reign” (Rogers, 1988, p. 154).  The 
Qianlong emperor especially preferred Castiglione/Lang for the “verisimilitude of Lang’s 
painting” and for his knowledge of Western architecture styles (Rogers, 1988, p. 154).  
However, “Lang was not motivated by purely aesthetic goals and artistic concerns.  His 
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sole purpose in serving the emperor so assiduously was of course to further the goals of 
the Jesuit mission in China” (Rogers, 1988, p. 157).  Thus Castiglione/Lang in the Qing 
court was in service to both the Christian faith and the Qianlong emperor in this early 
East-West encounter. 
 East-West encounters also occurred in the twentieth century.  In fact, Chinese 
communism is the product of an East-encounter as China borrowed “Western ideologies 
to serve Chinese revolutionary ends” (Meisner, 1986, p. 3).  From China’s perspective, 
“Marxism was seen as the most advanced intellectual product of the modern West, but 
one that rejected the Western world in its capitalist form and its imperialist relationship 
with China” (Meisner, 1986, p. 18).  The origin of the Chinese Communist Party can be 
traced to the general intellectual ferment of early twentieth-century China and the May 
Fourth incident11 of 1919.  At this historical moment, “a portion of the Chinese 
intelligentsia began to turn to the example of the Russian Revolution and the Marxist 
promise of worldwide revolutionary transformation” (Meisner, 1986).  The Cultural 
Revolution in the late 1960s would demonstrate that China, not the imperialist Soviet 
Union, was the true home Marxism.  “It was assumed that the success of socialism in 
China, to be ensured and demonstrated by the success of the Cultural Revolution, would 
serve as the model and stimulus for successful socialist revolutions elsewhere” (Meisner, 
1986, p. 398).  This East-West encounter took the form of Chinese appropriation of 
Marxism such that Mao’s Cultural Revolution would make China more Marxist than the 
                                                 
11 On May 4, 1919, over 3,000 university students protested certain provisions in the Versailles peace 
conference ending the Great War “to transfer the former German imperialist concessions in Shantung 
province to Japan as war booty” (Meisner, 1986, p. 17). 
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West.  “A socialist China would thus become the ‘revolutionary homeland’” (Meisner, 
1986, p. 398).   
It is perhaps surprising that both of these East-West encounters – Castiglione/ 
Lang in the Qing court and the Chinese appropriation of Marxism – are forms of cultural 
diplomacy.  All forms of diplomacy concern “engaging foreign audiences” (Finn, 2003) 
in the words or “the formal interaction of states” (Chang, 2011).  Cultural diplomacy, 
however, is a special case of diplomacy in which…  
art is itself a medium, a platform that can serve to advance dialogue across 
various sorts of boundaries rooted in traditions, beliefs, social practices, 
geographies, times, and values. Art is an avenue of cultural exchange and 
interaction. And specific works of art can themselves embody those very 
conversations, with the creation of the new, unexpected, and arresting. (Chang, 
2011, p. 139) 
 
The instrumentalization of art is the essence of cultural diplomacy.  Castiglione/Lang in 
the Qing court introduced Western painting techniques to China to facilitate his primary 
work as a Jesuit missionary ministering to China.  In Chang’s words, Castiglione/Lang’s 
cultural diplomacy resulted in the “creation of the new, unexpected, and arresting” in 
Chinese art.  The Chinese appropriation of Marxism is no less cultural diplomacy, though 
possibly not as obvious.  In Chang’s words, the art of Karl Marx “serve[d] to advance 
dialogue across various sorts of boundaries rooted in traditions, beliefs, social practices, 
geographies, times, and values.”  The appropriation of Marxism, however, is distinct 
from Soviet socialist realism in which artists and art were called directly to serve the 
state.  As Andrei Zdhanov said in his 1934 speech to the Congress of Soviet Writers: 
“Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of the human souls…it means knowing 
life so as to be able to depict it truthfully in works of art, not to depict it in a dead, 
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scholastic way, not simply as ‘objective reality,’ but to depict reality in its revolutionary 
development” (Zdhanov, 2003, p. 427).   
 My purpose in Chapter 2 is to examine the successful instrumentalization of the 
arts in Sino-American cultural diplomacy during the Cold War.  Roughly falling between 
the late 1940s in the wake of World War II and 1989 (i.e., the fall of the Berlin Wall), the 
Cold War is portrayed in general terms as the epic struggle between democracy and 
communism, or the USA/Western Europe vs. the Soviet Union/China/Eastern Europe.  
The eminent Cold War historian John Gaddis (2005) quotes President Ronald Reagan 
drawing Cold War lines in his speech at Notre Dame University on May 17, 1981: “The 
West won’t contain communism, it will transcend communism.  It won’t bother 
to…denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last 
pages are even now being written” (p. 223).  The medium of modern art was instrumental 
in the cultural diplomacy of both sides.  As art historian Claudia Mesch puts it: “During 
the Cold War both the US and the Soviet States used modern art as a means of 
persuading a world public of their new global identification with one or another side of 
the conflict, either US-style democracy or Soviet-style State socialism” (Mesch, 2013, p. 
4).  China, however, had an interesting role in the Cold War because it was not fully 
aligned with either side.  After World War II, China’s contact with the West quickly 
disappeared as the Kuomintang regime collapsed.  China’s isolation continued in its art 
through the Cultural Revolution.  “The Cultural Revolution severed all China’s remaining 
artistic contacts with the West” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 190).  But, to China, the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was evidence of its imperialism and 
the impurity of its Marxism, though the “Sino-Soviet split” probably started appearing a 
  38 
decade earlier.  “The Chinese Communists first place Soviet ‘social imperialism’ on a 
footing with American imperialism, both principal enemies of the oppressed nationals 
and of China” (Meisner, 1986, p. 399).  Soon after the Cultural Revolution began, 
however, China’s emerging foreign policy and global economic strategy “defined the 
Soviet Union as the principal enemy, and correspondingly, dictated a tactical 
accommodation with the United States” (Meisner, 1986, p. 400).  And the Chinese arts 
and cultural diplomacy became vital in China’s efforts.  Thus both Chinese and American 
cultural diplomacy satisfy congressional aesthetics of putting the arts in serving the 
interests of the state.  I apply the socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the 
arts developed in Chapter 2 to examine Sino-American cultural diplomacy during the 
Cold War.     
A Socio-Economic Model of the Instrumentalization of the Arts 
 
 The socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts linking 
Throsby’s and Bourdieu’s conceptions of cultural capital is developed in Chapter 2.  Here 
I will only summarize the end-result.  The model rests on Coleman’s micro-macro 
interpretation of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Coleman, 
1987, 1994).  Coleman describes his interpretation as the “internal analysis of system 
behavior” that is useful for “examining processes internal to the system, involving 
component parts, or units at a level below that of the system” (Coleman, 1994, p. 2).  The 
kind of behavior Coleman’s model is appropriate for is emergent behavior (i.e., Weberian 
methodological individualism), not aggregated behavior: “The interaction among 
individuals is seen to result in emergent phenomena at the system level, that is, 
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phenomena that were neither intended nor predicted by the individuals” (Coleman, 1994, 
p. 5).  Coleman’s model seems particularly promising by framing the Throsbeian macro-
level cultural capital as the “emergent phenomena” from the Bourdieuan micro-level 
cultural capital, thus connecting the two conceptions. 
 The Coleman-Weber model is particularly instructive in providing a descriptive 
cultural-capital framework for understanding the operation of cultural diplomacy.  The 
key to this framework is that, as Julia Gricheva (2010) notes, cultural diplomacy is 
primarily concerned with the “high arts, as opposed to popular culture and mass cultural 
products… Art always has been an expression of national cultures and traditions, which 
is why arts play such an important role in the cultural diplomacy practices” (p. 171).  And 
the notion of the high arts as the “expression of national cultures and traditions” very 
closely approximates Throsby’s economic conception of cultural capital.  This is the 
stock of cultural capital that, on the one hand, flows at the macro level into cultural 
diplomacy because these are the objects that represent a nation and its traditions.  On the 
other hand, this stock and flow of cultural capital also fits into the most common types of 
cultural diplomacy during the Cold War: exhibitions and exchanges.  Bourdieu’s 
sociological conception of cultural capital, then, fits into the framework at the micro 
level.  As people from the host countries (i.e., hosting the exhibitions and exchanges) 
visit the exhibitions and/or interact with artists during exchanges, they acquire and 
reproduce cultural capital, feeding into the aims of cultural diplomacy.  Cultural capital 
has therefore been instrumentalized in this cultural-capital framework as it serves and 
supports cultural diplomacy at both the micro and macro levels.                
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Figure 4: A socio-economic model of the instrumentalization of the arts based on 
Bourdieu’s and Throsby’s conceptualizations of cultural capital 
 
Chinese Cultural Capital and Cultural Diplomacy 
 Chinese cultural capital almost did not develop in the twentieth century.  A 
startling fact about modern Chinese history is that in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, Chinese cultural traditions were viewed negatively as a problem and 
impediment to the nation’s development, not something to preserve and integral to 
national identity.  “The tendency was to discard traditional values and culture as 
unsuitable for China’s survival, and later to condemn them as the source of China’s 
problems” (Meisner, 1986, p. 12).  Moreover, in an ironic East-Western encounter, 
Chinese traditions and values were viewed within China as inferior to the West’s.  
Meisner (1986) identifies two iconoclastic strains.  First, “the values necessary for 
national strength in the modern world were to be sought in the wisdom of Western 
theories and ideologies, which had provided foreign powers with their economic and 
political predominance” (Meisner, 1986, p. 13).  Second, “the necessity to discard 
traditional Chinese beliefs and values that could not serve the overriding interests of 
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political power” (Meisner, 1986, p. 13).  Chinese traditions and culture, which is the stuff 
out of which cultural capital in a Throsbeian sense is made, was not valued and 
developed in fin-de-siècle China.    
 Although the art of calligraphy has always persisted and some Chinese painters 
continued to work in ink, Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s 
revived an interest in the Chinese traditions and culture.   Mao “made it clear that 
traditional forms need not be abandoned; what had to be changed was the attitude of 
social and intellectual exclusiveness…”  (Sullivan, 1989, p. 188).  In his Yenan Talks on 
Literature and Art in 1942, Chairman Mao reversed the relative value of Chinese culture 
vis-à-vis Western culture by “making foreign things serve China”: 
In theory, any Western art form might be adopted, or adapted, to meet China’s 
needs, while the use of the word serve showed that the foreign element, however 
important, would always be considered as the offering of an inferior, just as the 
gifts brought by foreign ambassadors were always regarded as ‘tribute.’ (Sullivan, 
1989, p. 188; emphasis in the original) 
 
Mao seemed to have understood the difference between, in James Cuno’s (2008) words, 
culture and national culture.  “The former has always been porous, constantly evolving 
and dynamic human creation, the result of numerous and endless influences from 
generations of contact with ‘foreign’ people” (Cuno, 2008, p. 92).  The latter, however, 
“is always a political construction.  It is a fixed concept coincident with the cultural 
identity the nation’s ruling forces claim for themselves and the nation” (Cuno, 2008, p. 
92).  And the latter – national culture – that chairman Mao privileged over the former.  It 
was at precisely this moment that Chinese cultural capital began to form (the north-west 
angle of Figure 2).  It should be remembered, however, that Maoist China remained 
culturally and artistically isolated as it was to be the Marxist “revolutionary homeland.”  
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“Chinese national isolation during the cultural revolution…was undertaken in the name 
of ‘proletarian internationalism’” (Meisner, 1986, p. 398).   
It was therefore only after Mao that China commenced in earnest its efforts in 
Cold-War cultural diplomacy (the north-east angle of Figure 4), which would be 
significantly later than the USA, as will be seen below.  In the 1950s and 1960s, China 
conducted cultural diplomacy in Latin America (see Ratliff, 1969) as well as in Eastern 
Europe based on the works of Qi Baishi.  But the formation of Chinese cultural capital 
begun under Mao developed rapidly with the Chinese economy: “Chinese interest in 
protecting and preserving cultural relics, and cultural property generally, has increased 
coincident with the nation’s economic development” (Cuno, 2008, p. 97).  Moreover, 
China began to see the advantages of instrumentalizing its cultural capital in cultural 
diplomacy as… 
Sino-Soviet leaders utilize the exchange of information, ideas, persons, and 
culture as a systematic and unified arm of foreign policy. . . . Activities which for 
democratic societies are basically uncontrolled are within the Soviet-style 
framework an essential ingredient of foreign relations and the conduct of 
diplomacy. (Walker, 1969, p. 45) 
 
The Forbidden City exhibitions that toured the world to be discussed immediately below 
exemplify Chinese post-Mao, Cold War cultural diplomacy (Naquin, 2004, p. 365).  Two 
other examples of Chinese cultural diplomacy during the Cold War – the cultural 
exchange of Zhang Shuqi and The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People’s 
Republic of China at two venues in the USA – are also discussed. 
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Examples of Chinese cultural diplomacy during the Cold War. 
1. The Forbidden City exhibitions. 
The Forbidden City exhibitions, the first of which was sent to Japan in 1974 
(Naquin, 2004, p. 345), exemplified China’s post-Mao cultural diplomacy during the 
Cold War.  Susan Naquin, whose article “The Forbidden City Goes Abroad: Qing History 
and the Foreign Exhibitions of the Palace Museum, 1974-2004” (2004) provides most of 
the material for this section, contextualizes China’s cultural diplomacy: “The story of the 
Beijing Palace Museum’s Forbidden City foreign exhibitions reveals how, in the context 
of an expanding web of bilateral diplomatic relations, a repertory of objects was 
progressively refined and used to introduce Chinese history and cultural to the West” 
(Naquin, 2004, p. 345).  These exhibitions that toured the West derived from China’s 
nascent cultural capital.   
Building on the established prestige of ancient Chinese artifacts, these exhibitions 
not only celebrated China’s involvement with the non-communist world, they 
reasserted its claims to being a great and venerable civilization and they 
associated the Maoist government with the preservation of China’s cultural 
heritage. (Naquin, 2004, p. 343) 
 
Instead of being an impediment to China’s modernization, China’s rich traditions and 
culture as embodied in the cultural capital on display Forbidden City exhibitions could 
serve the purpose of promoting China to the West.  “Through tourism and these high 
profile Palace Museum shows, the Forbidden City, whether as the Cidade Proibida, Cité 
Interdite, Shikinjō, Verbotene Stadt, Verboden Stad, was now a familiar symbol of 
China” (Naquin, 2004, p. 356).   
The Forbidden City exhibitions thus instrumentalized China’s developing cultural 
capital.  Exhibition visitors from the host countries could acquire and reproduce the 
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cultural capital embodied in the objects (the south-east angle of Figure 4). Thirty-three 
Palace Museum exhibitions of between 70 and 120 items travelled abroad from 1974 
through 2004 in 13 countries plus Hong Kong and Macao: Seven to Europe (for a total of 
25 months), seven to Japan (36 months), four to Hong Kong, and five to the USA (48 
months) (Naquin, 2004, pp. 364-365).  There was a “formulaic” Forbidden City 
exhibition (see Figure 4):   
Past emperors were embodied in two imperial seals and a bright gold dragon robe, 
but the centerpiece was a ‘throne’…from one of the palace halls.  A variety of 
expensive objects—bowls and boxes of cloisonné lacquer, enamelware, and 
jade—exemplified eighteenth century ‘craftsmanship.’  A few Ming bowls and 
paintings were outnumbered by examples of Qing porcelain and court paintings.  
A long handscroll illustrated the 1751 birthday celebration of the mother of the 
Qianlong emperor… (Naquin, 2004, p. 346) 
 
The most common themes of exhibitions included “a world of ceremony and ritual [that] 
revolved around the Emperor,’ the creative genius and technical virtuosity…of thousands 
of anonymous artisans, and friendship and cultural exchange” with, for example, the 
Chinese people who lived in the U.S. when the exhibitions were held there (Naquin, 
2004, p. 361).12  There were many other Chinese archaeological exhibitions that 
complemented the Forbidden City exhibitions, such as Great Bronze Age of China at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City in 1980.     
 
 
 
                                                 
12 There were shifts in exhibition themes from 1974 to 2004 “toward a great appreciation of court life, 
Central Asian elements in Qing culture, China’s links with Europe, and the cultural richness of the 
Qinglong reign” (Naquin, 2004, p. 379) 
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Figure 5. A “formulaic” Forbidden City exhibition. [Imperial Throne for Qing Qianlong 
(1736-1795)]  
 
 
 
2. The Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People’s Republic of China. 
Another post-Mao exhibition similar to the Forbidden City exhibitions was The 
Exhibition of Archaeological Finds of the People’s Republic of China (Archaeological 
Finds) at the National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC (1974-5) and the Nelson Gallery-
Atkins Museum, Kansas City, Missouri (1975).  The exhibition catalog reads: 
A few years ago, word reached this country of the recent extraordinary 
archaeological discoveries that had been made throughout the People’s Republic 
of China—finds that were not only of great archaeological interest but often of 
incomparable beauty.  These exceptional objects, spanning some 600,000 years of 
China’s past, are now being shown in the Capital and subsequently in Kansas 
City. (Boutoun, Amussen, & Warwick, 1974, p. 11) 
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As in the Forbidden City exhibitions, visitors to Archaeological Finds can acquire and 
reproduce the cultural capital embodied in the objects (the south-east angle of Figure 2).  
This exhibition was sent to America at the same time as the Forbidden City was first sent 
to Japan and most likely shared the same cultural-capital aims described by Naquin for 
the Forbidden City exhibitions as “building on the established prestige of ancient Chinese 
artifacts,” “celebrat[ing] China’s involvement with the non-communist world,” and 
“reassert[ing China’s] claims to being a great and venerable civilization and they 
associated the Maoist government with the preservation of China’s cultural heritage. 
(Naquin, 2004, p. 343).  In other words, Archaeological Finds instrumentalized cultural 
capital to serve China’s cultural diplomacy (see Figure 4 for the cover image of the 
exhibition catalog). 
Figure 6.  Cover image from the Archaeological Finds of the People’s Republic of China 
exhibition catalog. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Bronze Galloping Horse was unearthed in 1969 in the Leitai Tomb of the 
Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 A.D.) in Wuwei County, Gansu Province. The bronze 
statue is a famous representative sculpture of the Han Dynasty.   
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3. Zhang Shuqi. 
The artist Zhang Shuqi sent from China on a cultural exchange to the United 
States in the early part of World War II.  Cultural exchange represents an interesting form 
of cultural diplomacy in which it is not inanimate objects that embody cultural capital but 
rather a living artist who represents as well as possesses the cultural capital in his person 
and his craft (the north-west angle of Figure 4).  Moreover, the artist can stimulate the 
acquisition of cultural capital in those with whom he or she interacts (the south-east angle 
of Figure 4).  The artist himself or herself can also acquire cultural capital (also the south-
east angle of Figure 4).  “As with a civilization,” Sullivan writes, “whether or not an artist 
responds voluntarily to the challenge of an alien form, style or technique depends 
ultimately on whether it fulfils a need for him” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 274).   
The story of Zhang Shuqui’s cultural exchange with the USA is an interesting one 
[most of this section is derived from Gordon Chang’s 2011 article “Chinese Painting 
Comes to America: Zhang Shuqi and the Diplomacy of Art” ].  One of the most 
interesting features of Zhang’s cultural exchange is that it transcends communism: 
Zhang’s cultural diplomacy predates Chinese communism but continues through it.  In 
the fall of 1941, China sent Zhang with a diplomatic visa to the USA to follow his 
popular painting Messengers of Peace (1940; Figure 7), which reportedly was first hung 
in the White House after its initial acceptance and then permanently displayed in the 
exhibition hall of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum in Hyde 
Park, New York, where it remains today (Chang, 2011, p. 132).  Zhang’s mission was 
one of cultural diplomacy as his exchange was “to introduce Chinese culture to the 
American people and promote friendship in what quickly became a common cause after 
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Japan’s December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor” (Chang, 2011, p. 132).  Unable to return to 
China after the Pearl Harbor attack, he stayed for five more years.  Zhang “helped to 
bring Chinese painting to America. He brought not just paintings as objects—which 
museums had long held, elite patrons admired, and scholars had studied. Under the 
exigencies of global conflict, he brought Chinese painting as event, as activity, and as 
something accessible to a broad spectrum of Americans.” (Chang, 2011, p. 146).   
 
Figure 7. Zhang Shuqi, Messengers of Peace (also known as A Hundred Doves), 1940. 
Ink and color on silk mounted on paper, 64 × 140 in. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential 
Library and Museum, Hyde Park, NY  
 
 
 
 In addition to embodying Chinese cultural capital, Zhang also embodied the East-
West encounter as he “was a serious artist who constantly studied both Chinese and 
Western art texts and paintings…” (Chang, 2011, p. 133).  Despite the allures of 
“Western notions of abstraction,” Zhang “never broke with representational painting [in 
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which he was] so skillful with the Chinese brush” or Chinese naturalism (Chang, 2011, p. 
133).  (See Figure 6.)  While Birds and Sunflower evokes the impasto of Van Gogh’s 
sunflowers, “Zhang also employs the vigorous use of black ink calligraphic brush strokes. 
The rendering of the flowers, in contrast, is accomplished…with thick, layered pigment 
that may recall the impasto of western oil paints.” (Chang, 2011, pp. 133-134).  As part 
of his cultural exchange Zhang included live demonstrations of him producing his work: 
“Many things intrigued his American audiences at the demonstrations, including his 
unusual handling of materials, especially the brush, the application of paints, and his 
composition” (Chang, 2011, p. 136).  Zhang thus stimulated the acquisition and 
reproduction of cultural capital (the south-east angle of Figure 2).   
 
Figure 8. Zhang Shuqi, Birds and Sunflower, hanging scroll, ink and color on paper, 
1941.  41.7 x 23.2 in.   
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American Cultural Capital and Cultural Diplomacy 
 Cultural capital developed in the USA – coincidentally, the land of capitalism – 
much earlier than in China.  In fact, unlike China’s nineteenth when its traditions and 
culture were negatively perceived as impediments to advancement, the USA actively and 
entrepreneurially engaged in cultural-capital formation during its industrialization in the 
nineteenth century.  The American cultural sociologist Paul DiMaggio (1986a) writes that 
“cultural capitalists” were responsible for the classification of high and popular art and its 
institutionalization (p. 43).  Also known as the “Boston Brahmins,” these individuals 
promoted for cultural-spatial formation in both the Throsbeian and Bourdieuan senses 
(both the upper-west and lower-east angles of Figure 2).  American capital also 
transferred European culture capital to the USA. Elsewhere DiMaggio (2000) writes of 
the cultural-capital accumulation in the USA:  
Thus, it happened that by 1930 a particular selection of European artworks and 
styles was constituted as cultural capital in the United States-that is, it became 
hierarchically differentiated from other kinds of culture, symbolically potent, and 
universally acknowledged. (p. 44) 
 
Not unlike China at least 50 years later, cultural capital in the USA developed 
simultaneously with the development of capitalism.  This represents the 
institutionalization of cultural capital at the national level, “which entailed both near-
universal apprehension (and acknowledgment as legitimate) of the scheme of 
classification of symbolic goods and the emergence of institutions with the cultural 
authority to sustain and regulate the currency” (DiMaggio, 2000, p. 42).  It is important to 
note that government policies have contributed to the institutionalization of cultural 
capital in the USA (DiMaggio, 1986b, p. 205). 
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 America also produced its own, indigenous cultural capital in form of abstract 
expressionism.  Originating in the United States, abstract expressionism includes 
“Pollock, Soulanges, Kline, for example, and sometimes Tobey and de Kooning, but not 
Rothko, Debuffet or Appel” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 3).  While abstract expressionism 
originated in pre-war USA, it “in its many forms became a vital strand in contemporary 
art the world over” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 3).  Under the auspices of critics such as Clement 
Greenberg (e.g., Greenberg, 1961a), American art of 1950s, particularly abstract 
expressionism, lent itself to instrumentalization.  As “part of a general tendency in 
intellectual circles toward ‘objectivity,’” abstract expressionism separated art from 
politics and “perfectly served America's needs in the cold war” (Cockcroft, 1994, p. 89).  
For example, not only does the flatness of modernist art in a way render it packageable, 
but also its self-containment, or movement towards the “autonomous and irreducible in 
the medium or purely of the medium” (Sandler, 1996, p. 2), could be seen as almost 
commoditizing it.  In this era of cultural-capital formation abstract expressionism 
“dominated because they were thought to best represent not only aesthetic excellence but 
also the free expression symbolic of American society, especially during the Cold War” 
(Binkiewicz, 2004, p. 112).  In his famous essay “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” (1961b), 
Greenberg traces the origins of art to bourgeois society: “In seeking to go beyond 
Alexandrianism [i.e., classicism], a part of Western bourgeois society has produced 
something unheard of heretofore: —avant-garde culture.  A superior consciousness of 
history—more precisely, the appearance of a new kind of criticism of society, an 
historical criticism—made this possible” (p. 4).  Greenberg was the quintessential critic 
with “a superior consciousness of history” who served as a potent catalyst in the further 
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development of abstract expressionism-based cultural capital in the USA (north-west 
angle of Figure 2). 
 The USA was equally precocious in cultural diplomacy during the Cold War.  The 
federal government made a concerted effort to instrumentalize the stock of American 
cultural capital in the service of its cultural diplomacy.  As Mesch (2013) puts it, “During 
the Cold War the US successfully deployed and (re)politicized the forms of dissenting 
modern art in order to promote its own goals with global, Cold War alliances” (Mesch, 
2013, p. 5).  “To put it in crass terms, art became a weapon in the cold war” from the 
Eisenhower administration onwards (Smith, 2008, p. 38).  These early government efforts 
at cultural diplomacy were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, as 
well as the U.S. State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations (Finn, 2003, p. 15).  
American cultural diplomacy stood for democracy; its cultural diplomacy, then, was 
aimed at undermining communism.  “Throughout the postwar era, desperate and 
disenfranchised young people in developing countries sought solace in communism. 
Rather than allowing this trend to continue unchecked, American officials mounted a 
determined, and ultimately successful, ideological campaign in response.” (Finn, 2003, p. 
15).  And the anticommunist was directed at the Chinese as well.  “The U.S. State 
Department…found it politically expedient to include accounts of successfully 
assimilated Chinese Americans in Cold War narratives of race in the United States as 
evidence of the superiority of liberal democracy to communism” (Wu, 2008, p. 393).  
Cold War cultural diplomacy even influenced the establishment of the National 
Endowment for the Arts in 1965, the federal agency directly supporting the art in the 
USA.  “One of the key assumptions here is that America, however much it might be 
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momentarily compromised by Cold War methods it was forced to adopt by the policies of 
the Soviet Union, is a country whose destiny is to exist in a state outside or beyond 
ideology.  Another is that what guarantees Americans’ access to this state is art.” 
(Brenson, 2001, p. 18) Below are discussed two crucial pieces of American cultural 
diplomacy during the Cold War: American exhibitions of abstract expressionism abroad 
as well as an instance of cultural exchange with China. 
Examples of American Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War. 
1. Abstract Expressionism. 
Abstract expressionism was the center of American cultural diplomacy during the Cold 
War (north-west angle of Figure 2).  Abstract expressionism was supposed to represent 
“the best and brightest hope of high culture in America” that could stand alongside 
European modernism (Binkiewicz, 2004, p. 98; Smith, 2008, p. 42).  Indeed, Sullivan 
(1989) argues that Abstract expressionism was an East-West encounters unto itself: 
“…the movement that linked East and West was nonfigurative and based on the dynamic 
or calligraphic gesture, whether the hand that made the gesture held a brush or a dripping 
can” (Sullivan, 1989, p. 3).  (See Figure 9.)  The United States Information Agency 
(USIA), established in 1953, and the International Program (later in 1956 the 
International Council) of Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) took over the promotion of 
American modernism abroad by organized its traveling exhibitions of American high, 
such as Twelve Modern American Painters and Sculptors (1953), Modern Art in the US 
(1956), The New American Painting (1958-9), and Jackson Pollock, 1912-1956 (1958-9).  
“It did then appear that by 1959 the US—that is to say New York’s MoMA, in 
conjunction with the federal USIA—had in some ways ‘stolen the idea of modern art’ 
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from Europe, or had at least established itself for the first time as the major center of a 
progressive modernism in the West” (Mesch, 2013, p. 35).  The New American Painting 
exhibition, for example, associated “Pollock’s style, along with that of the other abstract 
expressionist painters, with democracy” (Mesch, 2013, p. 35).  Through the cultural 
diplomacy of these exhibitions the United States endeavored to stimulate the acquisition 
and reproduction of American cultural capital embodying American values in visitors at 
the micro level (south-west angle of Figure 4).  
 
Figure 9. Franz Kline, Cardinal, 1950.  Exhibited at The New American Painting (1958-
9)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  55 
Figure 10. Installation view of Twelve Modern American Painters and Sculptors, Museé 
National d'Art Modern, Paris, 1953. 
 
 
 
2. Jade Snow Wong. 
 Like China’s cultural exchange of Zhang Shuqi with the United States, the United 
States also had cultural exchanges with China, such as that of Jade Snow Wong (Figure 
9).  [Most of this section is based on Ellen Wu’s article “‘America's Chinese’”: Anti-
Communism, Citizenship, and Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War” (2008).]  “With 
the ‘loss’ of China to Mao Tse-tung in 1949, the State Department turned its attention to 
ethnic Chinese throughout Asia as a specific target audience for anti-communist 
propaganda campaigns” (Wu, 2008, p. 397).  Wong was a Chinese-American artist 
(Figure 9) and writer (most famously the author of the book Fifth Chinese Daughter, 
1945).     
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The State Department’s decision to utilize Chinese Americans in its Cold War 
narrative of race and democracy in the United States also included sending 
Chinese Americans on cultural diplomacy tours of Asia in the 1950s. Anti-
communism intersected with changing currents of American liberalism and an 
unprecedented salience of cultural pluralism, providing new opportunities for the 
legitimization of Chinese American citizenship and important bases for inclusion 
in the nation in the mid-twentieth century,” such as writer and artist Jade Snow 
Wong. (Wu, 2008, p. 42) 
 
Wong played her part as cultural diplomat perfectly as her “messages to her audiences 
throughout Asia celebrated the promises of liberal democracy and cultural pluralism in 
the United States.”  Her standard speech on tour in China sounded something like this: 
Perhaps if I tell you of my early childhood, which was not so different from that 
of many other children born to immigrants in America, Asian or otherwise, and 
how such a ginning could grow into the miracle of standing before you now, I 
could somehow tell you the truth concerning America as I have known it. (Wu, 
2008, p. 409) 
 
As discussed above with respect to Zhang, the artists in cultural exchanges both 
embodied cultural capital (the north-west angle of Figure 2) and stimulated the 
acquisition and reproduction of cultural capital (the south-east angle of Figure 2).  
Alluding to the artist’s own acquisition of cultural capital, Sullivan (1989) observes:  
“Where East and West meet is in the mind of the artist himself, and the processes of 
acceptance and transformation depend ultimately on the choices he makes” (Sullivan, 
1989, p. 274). 
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Figure 11. Jade Snow Wong at the ceramics wheel 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Congressional aesthetics maintains that the federal government would support the 
arts, but it would do so only if the arts were useful for the state’s interests.  An exemplar 
of congressional aesthetics is the case of Sino-American cultural diplomacy in the Cold 
War.  From both the American and Chinese sides, art was instrumentalized to serve both 
states’ endeavors in cultural diplomacy.   The socio-economic model of the 
instrumentalization of the arts demonstrates how cultural diplomacy utilized American 
abstract expressionism, Chinese archaeological findings, and artist exchanges to promote 
their interests during the Cold War. Cultural diplomacy is primarily concerned with art 
that honorifically expresses nation’s culture and traditions that very closely approximates 
Throsby’s economic conception of cultural capital.  This is the stock of cultural capital 
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that, on the one hand, flows at the macro level into cultural diplomacy because these are 
the objects that represent a nation and its traditions.  On the other hand, this stock and 
flow of cultural capital also fits into the most common types of cultural diplomacy during 
the Cold War: exhibitions and exchanges.  Bourdieu’s sociological conception of cultural 
capital, then, fits into the framework at the micro level.  As people from the host 
countries (i.e., hosting the exhibitions and exchanges) visit the exhibitions and/or interact 
with artists during exchanges, they acquire and reproduce cultural capital, feeding into 
the aims of cultural diplomacy.  Cultural capital has therefore been instrumentalized in 
this cultural-capital framework as it serves and supports cultural diplomacy at both the 
micro and macro levels.                
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CHAPTER 4 
CONGRESSIONAL AESTHETICS AND THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE 
ARTS IN THE 1990S 
When Congress passed the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities 
National Endowment for the Arts (Public Law 89-209) in 1965, the National Endowment 
for the Arts (NEA) was created to administer direct government support for the arts in the 
United States.  An implicit agreement of “congressional aesthetics” underlay postwar 
government support for the arts in the U.S.: the federal government would support the 
arts, but it would do so only if the arts served the state’s interests.  Chapter 2 
demonstrated the exemplar of the congressional aesthetics, Sino-American cultural 
diplomacy during the Cold War that successfully instrumentalized the arts to promote 
both states’ interests.  Created in this Cold War environment of successful congressional 
aesthetics, the NEA led a quiet, comfortable existence of modestly increasing 
appropriations from Congress for the first 25 years of its existence.  Then, suddenly, the 
NEA became an epicenter of the culture wars in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the 
agency was associated with the support of art of Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano 
(Fig. x), then later in the 1990s the “NEA Four” of John Fleck, Holly Hughes, Tim 
Miller, and Karen Finley.  These NEA controversies demonstrated how far the NEA had 
strayed from congressional aesthetics and broken that implicit agreement that art would 
serve the state’s interests.  I argue in this chapter that the NEA controversies in the 1990s 
had its roots in failed congressional aesthetics.     
The NEA’s failed congressional aesthetics and the successful congressional 
aesthetics of Sino-American cultural diplomacy derive in large part from the different 
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types of art produced in the 1950s and 1980s.  Under the auspices of critics such as 
Clement Greenberg (e.g., Greenberg, 1961a), American art of 1950s lent itself to 
instrumentalization.  By contrast, American art of the 1980s art under the auspices of 
critics such as Rosalind Krauss (e.g., Krauss, 1985) and the October group defied it.  As 
art historian Irving Sandler (1996) puts it: “If the generative terms of the modernist 
paradigm were ‘autonomy’ and ‘quality,’ the competing term was ‘relevance,’ attained 
by confronting social issues or expressing the zeitgeist” (p. 4). “Autonomy” and “quality” 
bounded by two-dimensional flatness of abstract expressionism, for example, could be 
contained and controlled and thus instrumentalized while the social commentary and 
issue salience of 1980s art could not be.  The “subversive complicity” of 1980s art, such 
as that of Jean-Michel Basquiat and Keith Haring (Pearlman, 2003, pp. 99-100), 
challenged and threatened mainstream culture (Pearlman, 2003, pp. 99-100) and thus 
could not instrumentalized for governmental ends.  Art in the 1980s invoked social 
activism, identity politics, homosexuality, and AIDS – none of which could promote the 
state like Jackson Pollock painting.  Moreover, the shift from painting in the 1950s to 
photography and similar Benjaminian reproducible mediums in subsequent decades also 
defied governmental instrumentalization. Critic Susan Sontag (1989) finds that 
photography is uncontrollable and uncontainable because “photographs, which cannot 
themselves explain anything, are inexhaustible invitations to deduction, speculation, and 
fantasy” (Sontag, 1989, p. 23).  The controversial works of Serrano and Mapplethorpe 
reveal the problem posed by photography to congressional aesthetics. 
As a direct consequence of failing congressional aesthetics, the NEA became a 
bright “red” target for many political conservative members of Congress as well as the 
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public.  In Wyszomirski’s (1995b) words, the institutional environment of the NEA 
transmogrified from subgovernment into an issue network as many more political entities 
such as Congress suddenly started to watch the agency—and mostly did not like what 
they saw.  The attention was unwelcomed as suddenly the federal agency was under 
constant and credible threats to its very existence through the mid-1990s, entering what 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 2002) term a policy “punctuation” in which the political 
environment around a policy becomes unstable (Shockley, 2011).  At the very beginning 
of the tumult, Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) said on the floor of Congress: “If Senators want 
the Federal Government funding pornography, sadomasochism, and art for pedophiles, 
they should vote against my amendment” to severely limit the kinds of art that could 
receive federal funding (quoted in Bolton, 1992, p. 4).  Between 1990 and 1995 Rep. 
Robert Crane (R-IL) introduced legislation to eliminate the NEA at least once a year and 
sometimes twice (i.e., in 1993).  Then Newt Gingrich and the Republican revolution of 
the 104th Congress struck, vowing to eliminate the agency under the Contract with 
America.  Again in Wyszomirski’s (1999) words, “Between 1989 and 1996, the level and 
significance of both internal dissonance and external change seriously disrupted the 
American arts policy system.  A closer look reveals changes have been occurring in the 
character of the system’s core values” (p. 27).  Those core values implied congressional 
aesthetics.  Unlike Sino-American cultural diplomacy, the NEA had failed congressional 
aesthetics.  This chapter will detail NEA’s failed to implement congressional aesthetics, 
both in the how the NEA developed as a federal agency as well as the evolution of the 
postmodern art world in which the NEA became enmeshed.  I will conclude this chapter 
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with an analysis of the NEA controversies in the 1990s, which I argue is the consequence 
of the NEA’s failed congressional aesthetics.       
Congressional Aesthetics and the NEA’s Early Years 
 
 Congressional aesthetics, of the instrumentalization of the arts to serve the state’s 
interests, arose by design in the United States after World War II.  Even without the 
European traditions of government patronage of the arts (see Cummings Jr., 1991; 
Toepler, 2001; Townsend, 1985), government support for the arts in the US preceded the 
Cold War.  The sterling example is the President Roosevelt’s New Deal arts program 
managed by the Works Project Administration (WPA) during the Great Depression.  
Using the arts to stimulate employment, Roosevelt’s WPA arts program was “the largest 
art program ever in the world” employing approximately 40,000 artists and 
commissioning 1,371 murals (Cummings Jr., 1991).  Ancillary federal programs also 
were important, such as the Federal Theater Project and the Federal Writers Project.  The 
WPA in a way instrumentalized the arts by using them to provide jobs to Americans.  
The crucial difference between the WPA’s instrumentalization of the arts and Sino-
American (see Chapter 2) is that the former was not concerned with the content of the 
arts as was the latter.  In the WPA program, the arts simply were another economic sector 
that needed Keynesian stimulus.  In Sino-American cultural diplomacy, the arts 
themselves (abstract expressionism, archaeological objects) were put to work – 
instrumentalized – in service to the state.  The instrumentalization of the arts in Sino-
American cultural diplomacy is the exemplar of congressional aesthetics. 
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 I maintain that congressional aesthetics was what Congress intended for the 
federal agency when they passed into law the National Foundation for the Arts and 
Humanities (NFAH; Public Law 89-209) amid President Johnson’s Great Society 
programs in September 1965.  Supporters of the legislation made two egalitarian 
arguments to justify direct government support for the arts:  that artistic achievement 
should be available to all and that there should a “funding equivalence” between science 
and art (Moen, 1997, pp. 186-187).  “Other past legislation, such as the WPA art 
programs, was aimed at economic conditions of the artist,” recalls Christopher Mark in 
Reluctant Bureaucrats: The Struggle To Establish the National Endowment for the Arts 
(1991), a first-hand account of the NEA’s early years.  “This legislation, broad as it was, 
recognized our cultural pursuits as a bonafide concern of the government” (Mark, 1991, 
p. 19).  In Twigs for an Eagle's Nest: Government and the Arts (1965-1978) (1979), 
which is another first-hand account of the NEA’s years, Michael Straight identifies six 
principles embodied in NFAH: excellence in the arts, professionalism, independence for 
the agency, non-intervention, non-domination, and fiscal decentralization.  Not simply a 
means to stimulate employment, the NEA’s founding legislation suggests that now 
government expected to be involved directly in the nation’s art.  But a quid-pro-quo 
relationship in which the federal government expected the arts to support as the state 
supported the arts by promoting “American cultural values across the world” (Wallis, 
2002, p. 171).  President Johnson himself harbored “Cold War concerns” for the NEA in 
addition to his “national push for the human welfare of the Great Society” (Binkiewicz, 
2004, p. 75).  The kind of art the federal government expected the arts to produce was 
abstract expressionism, “the best and brightest hope of high culture in America” that 
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could stand alongside European modernism (Smith, 2008, p. 42).  “Abstract 
expressionists dominated because they were thought to best represent not only aesthetic 
excellence but also the free expression symbolic of American society, especially during 
the Cold War” (Binkiewicz, 2004, p. 112).  Abstract expressionism is the quintessential 
art for congressional aesthetics to instrumentalize in service to the state.   
 The presumption that the NEA would implement congressional aesthetics in the 
manner of Sino-American cultural diplomacy is evident in Congress’ inattention to the 
agency for the first 25 years of the agency’s existence.  One important tool available to 
Congress in its oversight of any federal agency is periodic reauthorization of the agency’s 
programs and overall performance.  Generally, Congress cannot appropriate funds to an 
agency until it has reauthorized it, though agencies can be funded through appropriations 
language without reauthorization.  During reauthorization Congress can insist on program 
deletions, additions, and modifications.  The length of the reauthorization period suggests 
Congress’ perceptions of an agency at any given time: shorter reauthorization periods 
(e.g., one or two years) could means Congress distrusts an agency and wants to review its 
programs more frequently while longer reauthorization periods (e.g., five years) suggest 
that Congress is not concerned with an agency.  Generally, Congress cannot appropriate 
funds to an agency unless it has reauthorized it, though agencies can be funded through 
appropriations language without reauthorization.  Figure 12 shows that Congress 
extended the NEA’s reauthorization period from two years in 1966 to five years by the 
end of the 1980s.   Wyszomirski (1988) observes that the growth and stabilization of 
NEA appropriations and the extension of its reauthorization period from two to five years 
are “evidence of the agency’s evolution from a controversial Great Society experiment 
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into an established agency administering a legitimate federal policy” (pp. 10-11).  
Another indicator of congressional oversight is the number of times a roll call votes is 
called on the floor of Congress regarding an agency: frequent roll call votes suggests that 
an agency is being watched while only a few roll call votes suggest that an agency is not 
being watched.  Figure 12 also shows that very few roll call votes regarding the NEA 
were called during the first 25 years of the agency’s existence.  One interpretation of the 
NEA’s lengthening reauthorization period and infrequent is that Congress presumed that 
the agency would implement congressional aesthetics after its establishment. 
Figure 12: The presumption of the NEA’s congressional aesthetics: lengthening 
reauthorization period and infrequent roll call votes 
   
Source: Shockley (2011) based on data compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
(1966 – 1987)  
 
 
  The NEA’s early leadership shaped the agency’s ability, capacity, and willingness 
to implement congressional aesthetics.  The NEA was set up according to the Fordist 
foundation model of administering grants to artists and art organizations rather than 
adopting a government patronage model from Europe (Cummings Jr., 1991).  But the 
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Fordist foundation model allowed for considerable flexibility in arts policy.  Roger 
Stevens and Nancy Hanks, the first two chairs of the NEA, had different visions for the 
role the NEA should play in American arts.  Stevens (1965-1969) envisioned an active 
role for the NEA to “set out to create new organizations and institutions which would 
look to government for guidance and for predominant support” (Straight, 1979, p. 75).  
On the other hand, Hanks (1969-1977) wanted the agency more to facilitate the arts 
rather than guide them.  She saw the “central purpose of government funding for the arts 
was to generate support from private sources” (Straight, 1979, p. 76).  Steven’s more 
heavy-handed vision for the NEA would have been more conducive to implementing 
congressional aesthetics because the agency could have injected them in grants and 
policies in providing “guidance and predominant support” to the American arts.  The 
lighter touch of Hank’s vision of the NEA as facilitator of the Americans arts would 
make it much more difficult and unlikely to implement congressional aesthetics.  Hanks 
vision for the agency won out over Steven’s as a guide and ultimately shaped the NEA.  
It would also leave the agency vulnerable to the controversies that would engulf it in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The tenure of Nancy Hanks was “marked by the maturation of each of the 
components of the potential arts-policy triangle, as well as by the enhancement of 
presidential support for the new agency and its programs” (Wyszomirski, 1988, p. 19).   
During the early decades of stability, the NEA was comfortably ensconced at the vertex 
of an iron triangle.  The other two vertices were occupied by interest groups, such as state 
and local arts agencies and arts service organizations, and the relevant authorizing and 
appropriations congressional subcommittees in the House and Senate (Rourke, 1987, p. 
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227).  Mulcahy (1988) describes this era in the Arts Endowment’s policy history as 
“cultural subgovernment.”  The NEA operated according to a “logic of constituency 
formation” in which the agency worked to build a national constituency to support its 
efforts to garner larger appropriations from Congress” (DiMaggio, 2000, p. 52).  In 
Lowi’s typology (see Lowi, 1964; 1972), the first-quarter century of U.S. arts policy was 
a simple distributive policy with very low levels of conflict (Burgess, 2004).  
Wyszomirski (1995b) writes that the Arts Endowment’s management of direct 
government support for the arts was a “relatively simple distributive policy sub-
government focused on increasing financial resources for the NEA and, through it, to the 
arts constituency” (p. 47).  Also according to Wyszomirski (1995a), the first two decades 
of direct federal support for the arts comprised a positive feedback loop generated by 
such axioms as “growing public interest and financial support;” “increasingly positive 
political regard with low visibility;” and “largely unchallenged artistic control of the 
grant decision making process” (p. 72). In short, Hanks made the NEA a successful 
federal agency that earned high regard from the arts world and almost absolute autonomy 
from Congress, as the general trend of increasing appropriation levels for the NEA in 
Figure indicates.   
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Figure 13: NEA appropriations during the presumption of congressional aesthetics 
(nominal dollars)    
 
 
Source: Shockley (2011) based on data compiled from published U.S. federal budgets 
(FY 1965 – 1989)  
 
 
 Cracks, however, began to appear in the NEA’s relationship to American arts.  
Brian Wallis, for example, chronicles the NEA’s program for alternative art space begun 
in earnest in 1978 under the Nixon administration.  The program arose during Nixonian 
Cold War policy of containment and so were “governed by a plethora of bureaucratic 
rules designed both to regulate the industry and to draw artists into a language of 
administration” (Wallis, 2002, p. 173).  Thus the alternative spaces the program 
supported were being encouraged to become exactly like the rationalized, “white-cube” 
art spaces like galleries and museums they opposed.  Further, the principles of 
independence, non-intervention, non-domination enshrined in NFAH and fully developed 
under Hanks tenure meant that the NEA had no influence in the kind of art being 
produced and exhibited with NEA support.  The NEA left artists and art alone.  And art 
and artists were changing.  In fact, some involved with the NEA recognized that art and 
artists had been changing since the 1960s (see Mark, 1991, p. xiii).  A tiny minority of 
Congress recognized this.  Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) in a report accompanying NFAH in 
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1965 recognized the anti-instrumentalization of contemporary art: “Moreover, modes of 
expression are not static but are constantly evolving…Therefore, the committee affirms 
that the intent of this act should be the encouragement of free inquiry and expression” 
(quoted in Spooner, 1997, p. 333).  But these were just a few voices in the raging storm 
that would be art in the 1980s.  
Postmodern Art and Criticism in the 1980s 
 
The idea of congressional aesthetics persisted in the criticism of the 1980s but 
was undermined by the nature of postmodern art from the 1960s onwards.  The major 
proponents of congressional aesthetics were naturally champions of modernism, Samuel 
Lipman and Hilton Kramer of The New Criterion.  Lipman, for example, supported the 
idea of the NEA but advocated for its divorce from contemporary 1980s art and culture 
and their penchant for affirmative action in hiring, a bias towards multiculturalism, and 
public advocacy towards and financial support for “cutting-edge art” (Lipman, 1992a, p. 
216).  Rather than supporting contemporary art, the NEA should support the “dead art” of 
the past in museums. “Instead,” Lipman wrote, “public art support might more fully 
concentrate on what it does so well: the championing of great art of the past, its 
regeneration in the present and its transmission to the future” (Lipman, 1992b, p. 42).  
“This would mean saying yes to civilization,” Lipman concluded, and “saying no to 
trash.”  Perhaps there is no better statement of congressional aesthetics.  Congressional 
aesthetics thus represents an archaic, if not primitive, aesthetics.  Ironically, 
congressional aesthetics was suspicious of early modernism’s origin in Europe. “Because 
Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism, Expressionism, Abstraction, and Surrealism, which had 
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shaped generations of American modernists, originated in Europe, modern art was un-
American” (Brenson, 2001, p. 5).  But when American modernism, particularly abstract 
expressionism, took the torch from Europe, congressional aesthetics represented 
civilization to Lipman, Kramer, and those like-minded. 
 
Figure 14. Richard Serra, Tilted Arc (installed in 1981; destroyed in 1989) 
 
From the 1960s onwards, however, pop art, minimalist sculpture, conceptualism, 
and seemingly all styles of postmodernism had moved far beyond congressional 
aesthetics, museum exhibitions, cultural diplomacy, and instrumentalizability of the arts 
exemplified by abstract expressionism.  Wendy Steiner identifies an “aesthetic paradox” 
in postmodernist art that was not present in the instrumentalizable American modernism 
of the 1950s.  Contemporary art “appears to provide a particularly intense experience of 
reality while not belonging to that reality in a straightforward manner” (Steiner, 1995, p. 
76).  This paradox of reality/unreality Steiner calls the “virtuality of art,” that is, art’s 
“symbolic reality, its subtle contradictoriness are simplified into a literalism that 
confounds practitioners, experts, and laypeople alike” (Steiner, 1995, p. 10).  And one 
might add members of Congress to the list of those confounded by postmodern art.  Thus 
art in the 1980s defies instrumentalizability and thus congressional aesthetics.  The 
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controversy over Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc (1981), a site-specific, minimalist sculpture 
commissioned by the federal government for the Foley Federal Plaza in New York City, 
illustrates the aesthetic paradox of postmodern art.  In Kramer’s words, “What proved to 
be so bitterly offensive to the community that Tilted Arc was commissioned to serve was 
its total lack of amenity…” (Kramer, 1992, p. 51).  To Kramer, Serra’s minimalist 
sculpture was simply a monumental piece of distraction.  
If Clement Greenberg’s criticism carried the banner for American modernism in 
the 1950s, Rosalind Krauss and her journal October carried it for postmodern art.  
“Krauss’s strategy was to embrace postmodernism, denounce modernism as the enemy, 
and use a deconstructive method to repudiate it” (Sandler, 1996, p. 341).  In her one of 
her most influential essays “The Originality of the Avant-Garde” (1985), Krauss 
deconstructs perhaps the grandest of the modernist myths: the myth of originality.  
Acknowledging Rodin’s death in 1918 and a bronze-casting of The Gates of Hell in 
1978, Krauss asks: “In what sense is the new cast an original?” (p. 151)  She argues that 
the modernist “cult of originality” is more than a declaration of inventiveness; it is “an 
organicist metaphor referring not so much to formal invention as to sources of life (p. 
157).  Deconstruction was the preferred analytical method of Krauss and October to 
“dismantle or demystify modernism, its cannon, and every one of its values” (Sandler, 
1996, p. 343), such as the myth of originality.  They also embraced new media, 
particularly photography, which “was viewed as central not only to advanced art but to 
society as well” (Sandler, 1996, p. 346).  The postmodern criticism of Krauss and 
October undid all of the certainty the Greenberg had built. 
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The onset of the AIDS pandemic added gun powder to the combustibility of 
1980s and its art, and the photography of Robert Mapplethorpe was the accelerator.  
AIDS, art critic Michael Brenson writes, was “an actual disease whose potency was 
demonstrated by Mapplethorpe’s death from AIDS in March 1989, just before the 
national spotlight began to shine on his exhibition” (Brenson, 2001, p. 94).  
Mapplethorpe’s The Perfect Moment exhibition was scheduled to stop in seven U.S. 
cities: Philadelphia, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Hartford, Cincinnati, and Boston.  The 
cancelation of his show by the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. and the trial 
concerning The Perfect Moment exhibition at the Contemporary Art Center in Cincinnati 
that put the “national spotlight” on his photography.  The $30,000 grant by NEA to 
support The Perfect Moment exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Art in 
Philadelphia put the national and congressional spotlight on the NEA.  Mapplethorpe’s 
explicit photographs of sado-masochism and gay underground culture converged with the 
awareness of the AIDS pandemic that sparked the conflagration of the NEA 
controversies.   
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Figure 15. Front cover of The Perfect Moment exhibition catalog.  Published by the 
Institute of Contemporary Art, Philadelphia in 1988 on the occasion of Mapplethorpe’s 
exhibition partially supported by the NEA. 
 
 
 
 Mapplethorpe’s photography, including the XYZ Portfolio drawn on for The 
Perfect Moment exhibition, was known and variously admired and controversial even 
before the NEA controversy.  Somewhat ironically, Mapplethorpe downplayed explicit 
homosexuality in the 1980s and instead focused on flowers like Georgia O’Keefe and 
nude black men more as classical sculptures than as sex objects.  But sex was his 
contribution to photography (Sandler, 1996, p. 533).  There is artistic merit to 
Mapplethorpe’s photography.  For example, Brenson observes: “The effectiveness with 
which [Mapplethorpe] captures the sexual, racial and social instability of the 1980s is one 
reason his work is so valuable and threatening” (Brenson, 1992, p. 69).  Similarly, 
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Sandler remarks: “Indeed, part of the attraction of his pictures is the way in which often 
repellant subjects, for example, sadomasochistic sexual acts, such as a fist or a whip 
shoved up the rectum, are anaesthetized” (Sandler, 1996, p. 533).  But conservative 
members of Congress and the vast majority of the public could not reach the artistic 
beyond “the challenge inherent within Mapplethorpe’s photographs to at least two 
important social hierarchies, sexual and racial” (Dubin, 1997, p. 369).  Although they 
might be able to articulate it in finer language, conservative art critics also could not see 
Mapplethorpe’s artistic merit.  According to Kramer of The New Criterion: “What one 
finds in many Mapplethorpe photographs is something else – so absolute and extreme a 
concentration on make sexual endowments that every other of the human subject is 
reduced to insignificance” (Kramer, 1992, p. 53).  The association of Mapplethorpe’s 
photography with the NEA destroyed Congress’ presumption that the NEA had 
successfully implemented congressional aesthetics.   
The postmodern art of the 1980s can be characterized by social activism, identity 
politics, homosexuality, and AIDS.  “In the 1980s artists would comment not only on 
sexism [that began in the 1970s], but on racism, homophobia, and ecological 
construction…” (Sandler, 1996, p. 18).  There was “unprecedented artistic activity” at 
this time, including an “expanding spectrum of artists” as well as “new sites, new media, 
new venues, and new issues …” (Yenawine, 1999, p. 9).  Again, the AIDS pandemic was 
particularly explosive.  As art critic and activist Lucy Lippard notes: “Fueled by rage and 
fear of real and present danger, rather than hypothetical and distant disaster, AIDS 
activists used graphic arts, media savvy, and mass mobilization to great effect” (Lippard, 
1999, p. 52).  Appropriation (of the Marcel Duchamp and Jasper Johns variety rather than 
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the Warhol variety of iconic consumerism) served as a key artistic technique (Sandler, 
1996, p. 312) in the work of, for example, Peter Halley and Jeff Koons (Pearlman, 2003, 
p. 20).  Contrary to the perception of 1980s art as being “an indiscriminate, anything-goes 
type of nihilism and historical amnesia,” 1980s artists consciously and “habitually use 
signifiers of style to evoke social types and systems associated with the consumption of 
particular styles” (Pearlman, 2003, pp. 145, 152).  Artists such as Jean-Michel Basquiat 
and Keith Haring along with Simulationists employed, in art historian Alison Pearlman’s 
locution, “subversive complicity” in the “deviant subcultures of style” such as Punk, 
Mod, Glam, Skinhead, and S&M (Pearlman, 2003, pp. 99-100).  Obviously, the 
postmodern art of the 1980s had fallen far away from the modernism of congressional 
aesthetics.  The process orientation and site specificity of conceptual art and alternative 
spaces, such as Artists Space that took over The Perfect Moment when the Corcoran 
cancelled it, also resisted instrumentalization required by congressional aesthetics 
(Wallis, 2002, p. 167).  “Adherents of conservative but still dominant modernism found 
themselves being deconstructed, subverted, appropriated, and repositioned by 
postmodernist perspectives so diverse as to defy categorization” (Yenawine, 1999, p. 9).   
 The gay subculture and, more generally, homosexuality was the most potent force 
of subversion to the modernist aesthetic of congressional aesthetics.  Mapplethorpe’s 
photography was not the only art doing it.  The New Queer Art preceded the NEA 
controversies of the 1990s: “Arguably Johns and Warhol were among a younger 
generation of painters in New York whose art turned against dominant notions of artistic 
masculinity as it had been set in place by the New York School, or abstract 
expressionism, of the 1940s and 1950s” (Mesch, 2013, p. 128).  But in the 1980s the 
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subversion of art with homosexual content increased in intensity.  For example, Glenn 
Ligon’s Notes on the Margin of the Black Book (1991-3) critiques Mapplethorpe’s Black 
Book (1986) (Mesch, 2013, p. 141), though not in a way that conservative members 
would champion.  The “humor and cartoonlike sentiment” of  Keith Haring’s work 
challenged homophobia, among other topics, and warned against AIDS (Sandler, 1996, p. 
471).  While David Wojnarowicz’s work differs significantly from Mapplethorpe’s, both 
artists “insist on homoeroticism as a valid subject of art” (Carr, 1992, p. 236).  
Wojnarowicz’s work defies “representations of sexuality that do not conform to the 
normative fantasies of white male heterosexuality” (Mesch, 2013, p. 143).  Wojnarowicz 
also  proclaimed his work an “X-ray of civilization” examining the foundations of a 
disintegrating society (Spooner, 1997, p. 335), which is certainly not conducive to 
instrumentalization and serving the interests of the state.  In fact, Wojnarowicz was 
another regular target of conservative members of Congress during the NEA 
controversies.   Rep. Dan Rohrbacher (R-CA) characterized Wojnarowicz’s exhibition 
Tongues of Flame as “an orgy of degenerate depravity” and his art generally as 
“sickeningly violent, sexually explicit, homoerotic, anti-religious and nihilistic” (quoted 
in Spooner, 1997, p. 335).  At the time, Lipman ruefully commented on this strain of 
postmodern art: “The simple fact that it is cutting-edge art, flagrantly exemplified in the 
Serrano, Mapplethorpe, Artists Space, and Sprinkle cases, more subtly presented in the 
genre as a whole, is concerned not with art but with advocacy, not with the creation of 
permanent beauty but with the imposition of hitherto rejected modes of behavior and 
ways of living” (Lipman, 1992a, p. 218).  “Permanent beauty” could serve the state’s 
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interests; representations of “hitherto rejected modes of behavior and ways of living” 
could not. 
 The medium of photography was also complicit in the subversion of modernism 
and congressional aesthetics.  The photography of Andres Serrano, the indirect 
beneficiary of the $15,000 NEA grant to exhibit his work at the Southeastern Center for 
Contemporary Art, exemplifies the danger it presents to the modernist aesthetic.  Cultural 
critic Susan Sontag asserts:  “Photographs, which cannot themselves explain anything, 
are inexhaustible invitations to deduction, speculation, and fantasy” (Sontag, 1989, p. 
23).  Sontag also observes that photography is a predatory and voyeuristic act of 
appropriation: “To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed.  It means putting 
oneself into a certain relation with the world that feels like knowledge-and, therefore, like 
power” (Sontag, 1989, p. 4).  Serrano’s appropriation of Christian icon of the cross 
submerged in urine in Piss Christ illustrates Sontag’s observations.  
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Figure 16: Andres Serrano, Piss Christ, 1987. Southeast Center for Contemporary Art, 
Durham, NC. Cibachrome print. 60” x 40”  
 
 
 
 
 
Lippard recounts a brief history of the photograph: “In 1988, Serrano decided that he 
needed a new color in his palette.  ‘Piss was the natural choice.’ It offered particularly 
dense luminosity, and being less ‘acceptable’ than blood and milk, raised the ante on 
content.” (Lippard, 1992, p. 203)  The aesthetic ante was raised too high for Sen. Jesse 
Helms (R-NC), perhaps the most strident critic of the NEA.  Sen. Helms commented on 
Serrano in Senate hearing on May 18, 1989: “I do not know Mr. Andres Serrano, and I 
hope I never meet him.  Because he is not an artist, he is a jerk.” (Helms, 1992b, p. 30)  
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In his autobiography Sen. Helms justifies his anti-Serrano stance by implicating the NEA 
in the production of Piss Christ:    
 
The federal government had funded an ‘artist’ who had put a ‘crucifix’ in a bottle 
of his urine, photographed it, and given it the mocking title Piss Christ.  The 
photographer obviously went out of his way to insult the Christian community, 
and that insult was compounded by the fact that Christian taxpayers had been 
forced, by their own government officials, to pay for it. (Helms, 2005, p. 142; 
emphasis in the original) 
 
Helms applied the logic of congressional aesthetics to the NEA and Serrano. Rather than 
supporting art that served the interests of the state, the NEA was supporting art that 
offended him, other conservative members of Congress, and a large portion of American 
public.  The NEA had failed in implementing congressional aesthetics, and there would 
be a price to pay.  
Failed Congressional Aesthetics: The NEA in the 1990s 
 
“The NEA's early and continued support of postmodern academic art led the 
agency, by the early nineties, into an almost constant state of controversy,” conservative 
commentator Lynne Munson declared.  “Two artists in particular came to symbolize the 
Endowment’s problems: Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano” (Munson, 2000, p. 
70).  
The subversive complicity 1980s postmodern art combined with the dangers of 
photography exposed the failed implementation of congressional aesthetics.  Congress 
neglected the NEA for almost a quarter-century after its founding as it developed into a 
fiscally healthy federal agency when Congress assumed that art was still controllable and 
packageable like abstract expressionism.  Yet, under the leadership of Nancy Hanks, the 
agency became enmeshed in the contemporary art world without being able to guide it.  
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Hanks successfully cultivated disciplinary and governmental arts constituencies such that 
government support for the arts flourished in the United States for nearly a quarter-
century (DiMaggio, 2000; Mulcahy, 1988; Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, 1988a, 1988b).  
If not directly redounding to the prestige of America, at least the NEA-associated art did 
not detract from it.  But the art world in the late 1980s and early 1990s had changed 
radically from that of the 1950s.  Again, the provocative art of Mapplethorpe and Serrano 
demonstrated how far from congressional aesthetics the agency had strayed.  Putting 
forth his “Helms amendment,” Sen. Helms recounts a brief episode with Sen. Robert 
Byrd (D-WV), then chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee:  “I showed the 
Senator some of the so-called ‘art.’ Senator Byrd took one look at it, shook his head, and 
said, ‘Good golly, I will support your amendment!’ And that is when the ballet began.” 
(Helms, 2005, p. 138).  Congress would punish the NEA for its failed congressional 
aesthetics.  Thus would commence the NEA controversies of the 1990s.   
The Helms amendment to restrict the content of the art that the NEA could 
support was the first measure Congress sought to impose on the NEA.   “Specifically, my 
amendment,’ explains Sen. Helms, “prohibits the use of NEA funds to support obscene or 
indecent materials, or materials which denigrate the objects or beliefs of a particular 
religion” (Helms, 1992a, p. 74).  The Helms amendment did not seek to dismantle the 
NEA.  Rather, in its essence, it can be seen to seek to return the NEA to congressional 
aesthetics. “Since the NEA refused to acknowledge the unfairness of its policy,” Sen. 
Helms explained, “the only solution was to provide it with the rules that it could not 
violate without breaking the law and facing arrest for having done so” (Helms, 2005, p. 
136).  Those rules would prevent the NEA from having the government support the 
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subversive postmodern art of the 1980s.   The Helms Amendment of 1991 that was 
adopted (HR 2686; September 19, 1991) exacerbated the NEA’s circumstances when the 
so-called “NEA Four”13 took legal action against the agency on First Amendment 
grounds.  Reaching the U.S. Supreme Court as NEA v. Finley14 (524 U.S. 569), this case 
brought still more attention to the NEA’s failed congressional aesthetics.  The Supreme 
Court in a resounding 8-1 decision endorsed the idea behind the Helms amendment that, 
in the senator’s words, “the NEA could indeed follow Congressional directives that set 
standards of decency as a criteria for the federal funding of art” (Helms, 2005, p. 143).  
The Helms amendment/Finley decision thus can be seen as an attempt to push the NEA 
back towards congressional aesthetics. 
The same data that showed the presumption of congressional aesthetics for the 
NEA’s early years also shows its failed congressional aesthetics.   Figure 17 indicates 
that floor votes on the NEA were much more frequent from 1989 through the mid-1990s.  
Increased frequency of roll call votes suggests that Congress is paying attention.  
However, Figure 17 does not show that for the first time these congressional floor votes 
were concerned with the legitimacy of government support for the arts, the NEA 
operations, and other substantive policy matters involved in direct federal support for the 
                                                 
13 John Fleck, Holly Hughes, Tim Miller, and Karen Finley were four individual artists whose grant 
applications were approved by Arts Endowment peer panels but were ultimately denied by the Arts 
Endowment. The first-amendment case NEA v. Finley was a direct result of the NEA Four.  
14 NEA v. Finley was decided by the Supreme Court on June 28, 1998.  Ruling in the Arts Endowment’s 
favor, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion held, “Any content-based considerations that many be taken 
into account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.  The NEA has 
limited resources and it must deny the majority of the grant applications that it receives, including many 
that it receives, including many that propose ‘artistically excellent’ projects” ("NEA v. Finley," 1998). 
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arts.15  Two of the more notorious pieces of anti-NEA legislation were the series of 
annual Crane Amendments from 1990 to 1994, which sought the most severe punishment 
for the agency by seeking its elimination and terminating direct federal support for the 
arts, and the Helms amendments of 1990 and 1991 discussed above.  Further, Figure 17 
also shows that the reauthorization period shrunk from a high of five years just before the 
NEA controversies to one year after them.  In fact, Congress never reauthorized the NEA 
in the 1990s. The presumption of congressional aesthetics disappeared.   
Figure 17: Failed congressional aesthetics: shrinking reauthorization period and frequent 
roll call votes 
 
 
 
Source: Shockley (2011) based on data compiled from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
(1986 – 2000)  
 
The Helms amendment/Finley decision, shrinking the reauthorization period, and 
frequent roll call votes on the NEA were not the only consequences of the NEA’s failed 
congressional aesthetics.  Figure 18 indicates that 104th Congress was able to slash the 
NEA’s appropriation for FY 1996 by 39 percent from FY 1995’s level.  In addition to the 
                                                 
15 No floor votes regarding the Arts Endowment occurred in 1996 because an agreement was reached in 
1995 whereby the Arts Endowment would be allowed to operate for two more years (1995 and 1996) but 
would be terminated beginning in 1997.  
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symbolic message conveyed by cutting appropriations, it had the real effects of forcing 
the NEA Endowment to lay off 89 staff members (a staff reduction of 37 percent) and 
limiting both the quantity and size of the grants it could award.   
Figure 18: NEA appropriations during failed congressional aesthetics (nominal dollars) 
 
 
 
Source: Shockley (2011) based on data compiled from published U.S. federal budgets 
(FY 1986 – 2002)  
 
 
The Republican-controlled 104th Congress also sought to exact the ultimate price: 
elimination of the NEA and termination of direct federal support for the arts.  The threat 
was credible.  The new Speaker of the House Gingrich (R-GA), junior House 
Republicans (Janowitz, 1995b), as well as the Republican-controlled Senate were intent 
on eliminating the NEA along with several other agencies as part of the “Contract with 
America.”16   De Leon (1997) observes, “the ‘termination blues’ [were] an integral part of 
                                                 
16 For example, consider the following “Sense of the Senate” amended to a concurrent budget resolution for 
FY 1996: “It is the sense of the Senate that to balance the budget the Congress should –                                          
(1) “Restructure federal programs to meet identified national priorities in the most effective and efficient 
manner so that program dollars get to the intended purpose or recipient; 
(2) “Terminate programs that have largely met their goals, that have outlived their original purpose, or that 
have been superseded by other programs; 
(3) “Seek to end significant duplication among federal programs, which results in excessive administrative 
costs and ill serve the American people; and  
(4) “Eliminate lower priority programs.” ("Senate Amendment to Concurrent Resolution on the Budget -- 
Fiscal Years 1996 - 2002," 1995) 
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the hymnal for the Republican ‘Contract with America’” (p. 2197).  Enacting their 
agenda through the House appropriations committee (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000) and 
“generally unorthodox lawmaking” (Sinclair, 2000, Chapter 11), Republicans targeted 
three categories of federal agencies for elimination: (1) “the symbolic budget trophy” 
agencies, such as the Office of Technology Assessment; (2) “those with significant 
budgets,” such as the Department of Energy; and (3) “those whose missions conflicted 
with the new conservatism brought to Congress by the class of 1994,” such as the NEA 
(Bimber, 1998, pp. 204-205).  Overall, as Pfiffner (2000) reports, the Senate sought to 
abolish more than 100 programs and agencies while the House more than 280.  These 
“termination blues” included the NEA: for example, a section of a concurrent budget 
resolution for FY 1996 was entitled “Terminate Funding for the National Endowment for 
the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities.”17  Eliminating the NEA would 
have unambiguously meant that Congress no longer believed the federal government 
should have an interest in American arts.  But Congress did not eliminate the NEA. 
                                                 
17 Under this proposal, Federal funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and the National 
Endowment for the Humanities would be eliminated. Federal funding for the arts and humanities is not 
affordable in a time of fiscal stringency, especially when programs addressing central Federal concerns are 
not fully funded. In addition, many arts and humanities programs benefit predominantly higher-income 
people, who could pay higher admission or ticket prices. Finally, there is serious philosophical debate about 
whether financing artistic creation is an appropriate government activity in the first place. (GPO, 1995) 
  85 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Might the arts be allowed to return in the parallel cultural policies of Plato and the 
NEA?  Plato seems to encourage art in Book X of the Republic: “All the same, let it be 
said that, if poetry directed to pleasure and imitation have any good argument to give 
showing that they should be delighted to receive them back from exile…”  (p. 10.607c).  
If the bad effects of art can be mitigated, or, better yet, eliminated and an art that was 
good for the virtue of citizens can be promulgated, then Plato would seem to allow it to 
return to his state.  Yet, art that is acceptable to Plato is politically correct art; art that is 
“morally responsible” (Gulley, 1977, p. 161); in short, art that serves the interests of the 
state.  Particularly well-trained art critics are required. Plato describes them in the Laws: 
Almost the finest Muse is she who pleases the best men and the adequately 
educated men, and especially finest is she who pleases the one man who is 
distinguished in virtue and education.  The reason why we assert that the judges 
of these matters should have virtue is that they must partake of the rest prudence 
and especially of courage.  The true judge should not learn from the audience how 
to judge, swept away by the noise of the many and his own lack of education.  
(1980, p. 2.659a) 
 
The philosopher Allan Bloom summarizes Plato’s position: “If a poet shares the 
perspective of the philosophic legislator, if he is capable of the moral and intellectual 
virtue required for such a liberation, and if that perspective can inform his poetry, 
Socrates has no quarrel with him” (Bloom, 1968, p. 432).   Elias (1984, p. 226) calls this 
a “weak” defense of poetry in which “the role of myths is to act as a pedagogical device.”  
(See also Rucker, 1966, p. 168.)  Plato stops well short of Elias’ strong defense of art in 
which art can represent new forms of knowledge or, indeed, wisdom (1984, p. 233).  
Plato seems to be saying that the arts can return, but it is utterly subject to the necessities 
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of politics.  “Poetry will return, but only after having learned to subordinate itself, to 
mitigate its unguided tendencies toward indulgence and fanaticism.  When the poets 
depict the gods they must no longer look to laughter and pity but to ideas” (Bloom, 1968, 
p. 434).  But if the arts can be instrumentalized and used to serve the interests of the state, 
then Plato allows art and politics to peacefully co-exist.   
Could Congress once again trust the NEA?  Could art, particularly challenging 
art, and government be reunited in the U.S.?  “For many of these same conservatives, 
controversial art remained the single greatest barrier to embracing the NEA” (p. 253).  
The controversies surrounding the NEA in the 1990s were “interlaced with the notion of 
what constitutes Americanness…” (Miller, 2000, p. 1432).  As Plato found them in 
Republic, the arts are a “relatively defenseless sphere of activity” (Dubin, 1992, p. 18).  
Most of the measures that Congress imposed on the NEA could be seen as attempts to 
return the NEA to congressional aesthetics.  They were meant to instrumentalize the arts 
to serve the state just as they were in Sino-American cultural diplomacy.  Consider the 
Helms amendment/Finley decision.  Justice O’Connor wrote in her majority opinion: 
Any content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the grant-
making process are a consequence of the nature of arts funding.  The NEA has 
limited resources and it must deny the majority of the grant applications that it 
receives, including many that it receives, including many that propose “artistically 
excellent” projects.  
 
Similarly, the Independent Commission of 1990 (p. 90) observed: 
 
Congress has, after all, enjoined the Endowment to foster excellence in the arts.  
The Chairperson must constantly make judgments about the nature and content of 
projects.  Yet if the standards for making these decisions are codified as explicit 
content restrictions, it seems clear that the result will be not more elevated art but 
debilitating administrative and legal difficulties. 
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But these congressional efforts raise serious questions.  Is constraining the NEA’s ability 
to fund certain content practical?  As Robert Hughes noted, “The conservative agenda of 
pre-vetting all grants for the moral content of their supposed results would make NEA 
sponsorship wholly impractical” (MIT, 1993, p. 18).  Does the federal government really 
want the NEA to instrumentalize the arts and implement congressional aesthetics?  If it 
does, then “the focus for future discussion should be not what the NEA has funded but 
rather those qualities the NEA has neglected to fund”  (Jarvik, London, & Cooper, 1995, 
p. 60).  As with Plato, art can return if it, in Blooms’ phrasing, learns to subordinate itself 
to the necessities of politics.  Does this kind of art truly serve the interests of the state? 
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Table 1: Selected NEA policy changes to direct federal support for the arts (1991-1996) 
 
1991 Changes:  
First Order 
1993 – 1994 Changes: 
 Second Order 
1995 – 1996 Changes:  
Third Order 
• First order: Including 
knowledgeable lay persons 
in panel membership 
• Second order: Eliminating 
individual fellowships, 
except for literature, jazz, 
and heritage  
• Third order: Restructuring 
grant programming from 17 
discipline-based grant 
categories to 4 thematic 
ones18 
• First order: Limiting panel 
service to no more than 3 
consecutive years 
• Second order: Eliminating 
sub-granting 
• Second order: Eliminating 
seasonal support  
• First order: Removing 
conflicts of interest in panel 
service 
• Second order: 
Consolidating 17 grant 
discipline-based categories 
to 1419 
 
• First order: Requiring all 
applicants to provide a 
project description 
  
• First order: Requiring 
interim reports from 
grantees and disbursing  
grant monies in installments   
  
 
Sources: (AAMD, 2004; J. Alexander, 2000; GAO, 1991; Janowitz, 1995a; Kimbis, 
1997a, 1997b)  
 
In the mid-1990s, the NEA made the radical decision to implement a 
programmatic restructuring of 17 discipline-based grant categories to four thematic ones.  
Beginning in FY 1996, the Arts Endowment abandoned its direct support of the artistic 
disciplines, such as dance, design, music, the visual arts, theater, media arts, etc., in favor 
of funding only a few generic art-related activities carried out in America’s vast 
nonprofit arts sector, such as historic preservation, arts education, and access to the arts.  
“The government decided,” the art critic Michael Brenson (2001) argues, “that in order to 
                                                 
18 Dance, Design, Folk & Traditional, Literature, Museum, Music, Opera-Musical Theater, Presenting, 
Visual Arts, Media Arts, Theater, Arts in Education, Challenge/Advancement, Expansion Arts, 
International, Local Arts Agencies, Special Constituencies, and State and Regional consolidated into 
Creation and Presentation, Heritage and Preservation, Education and Access, and Planning and 
Stabilization (including all partnerships). 
19 Music would also include Opera-Musical Theater and Presenting; Visual Arts would also include 
Museums. 
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save the Endowment, it had to stop investing in artists and invest its cultural authority in 
institutions” (p. 89).  This change registered a seismic shift in arts policy away from 
supporting the kind of projects that signaled the NEA’s failed congressional aesthetics, 
such as the work of Mapplethorpe, Serrano, and the NEA Four.  As Kimbis (1997b) 
remarks, “In order to remake the agency’s image into that of a more politically stable, 
inoffensive entity, the Endowment determined that its first priority was to reshape its role 
and agenda” (p. 149), which the Arts Endowment did by implementing the programmatic 
restructuring.  Does a compromised NEA truly serve the interests of the state? 
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